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Abstract 
We examine (a) the effect of market structure on the level of mortality for AMI, hip fracture, and 
stroke between 2002/3 and 2010/11 and (b) whether this effect changed after the introduction of 
Choice policy in 2006 which gave patients the right to a wider choice of hospital.  For AMI and hip 
fracture, hospitals with more rivals had higher mortality at the beginning of the period but this effect 
became smaller over the period. We find that the decline in the detrimental effect of market 
structure predated the introduction of Choice. Market structure had no effect on stroke mortality.  
JEL Nos: H51, I11, I18, L32, L33 
Keywords: competition, quality, hospital, choice 
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Executive Summary 
1. It is often suggested that if the price per patient treated is fixed then hospitals will have an 
incentive to raise quality to attract more patients and that this incentive is greater if hospitals face 
more rivals and if patient choice amongst hospitals is not restricted.   
 
2. From 2003 onwards the English NHS has encouraged the entry of new providers of elective (non-
emergency) hospital treatment.   In April 2006 patients were given the right to be offered a choice 
from at least four providers for elective (non-emergency) hospital treatment.  In 2008 this was 
extended to a right to choose any hospital in contract with the NHS.   
 
3. Most studies of the effects of market structure on quality have used mortality for patients with 
acute myocardial infarction (AMI) as the quality measure because AMI is well recorded and mortality 
can be reduced by appropriate hospital treatment.  Moreover, because AMI is not an elective 
condition, the quality measure is not biased by unobservably sicker patients choosing higher quality 
providers.  But because hospitals can compete only for elective patients it must be assumed that 
quality of care for AMI (or other emergency admissions used to measure quality) is correlated with 
quality of care for elective patients.   
 
4. Studies from the US have produced mixed results with some finding that providers with more 
rivals have lower AMI mortality and others that they have higher mortality or that there is no 
relationship.   
 
5.  Two recent studies of the English NHS examine how the introduction of Choice in 2006 changed 
the effect of market structure on AMI mortality.  Both find that there was a bigger reduction in 
mortality for hospitals with more rivals after the introduction of Choice. But these findings do not 
distinguish between Choice increasing the beneficial effect of more rivals in reducing mortality and 
Choice reducing the detrimental effect of more rivals in increasing mortality.   
 
6.  Policy makers should also be interested in the effect of the number of rivals on quality, not just in 
the change in this effect after the introduction of Choice.  We therefore test directly for the effect of 
market structure on quality as well as testing for changes in this effect after the introduction of 
Choice.    
 
7.  We use individual level data on AMI, hip fracture, and stroke patients admitted to English NHS 
hospitals between 2002/3 and 2010/11.  We measure the market structure facing a hospital by (a) 
the number of sites (NHS and private) providing elective care within 30km and (b) the predicted 
equivalent number of rivals (the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index computed from predicted patient 
flows). We estimate models with site fixed effects, year effects, and with patient covariates including 
morbidity, age, gender, deprivation, and distance to hospital.  
 
8.  We estimate two main models.  The policy break model assumes that the effect of market 
structure is the same in the four pre Choice years (2002/3 to 2005/6) and the same in the five post 
Choice years (2006/7 to 2010/11) but possibly different from the effect in the pre-Choice years.   The 
model provides a simple test for whether the effect of market structure changed after the 
introduction of Choice in 2006. We use it to investigate the robustness of findings to the measure of 
mortality, to the age range of patients, and whether the effect of market structure depends on the 
type of hospital and whether it is competition from NHS hospitals or private providers that affects 
quality.   
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9. If there is an underlying trend in the effect of market structure, the policy break specification will 
incorrectly attribute all the difference between the average post Choice and the average pre Choice 
effect of market structure to the introduction of Choice.  Our second, flexible, model allows the 
effect of market structure to vary across all years, not just after the introduction of Choice, and so 
avoids this problem.   
 
10.  Results from the policy break model show that in the pre-Choice period providers facing more 
rivals had higher AMI and hip fracture mortality.  In the post-Choice period the detrimental effect of 
rivals was smaller and statistically significant only for hip fracture. This suggests that Choice reduced 
the detrimental effect of having more rivals.   
 
11. Broadly similar results are obtained with mortality in any location, rather than just in-hospital 
mortality, and for different types of hospital (Foundation Trusts, Teaching hospitals, hospitals 
located in London).  The qualitative pattern of results is not sensitive to the measure of market 
structure, though effects are less precisely estimated when using the predicted equivalent number 
of rivals derived from estimated patient demand, perhaps because there is less variation in this 
measure.  Results are also sensitive to the age range of patients. For example, with all patients aged 
over 35, the effects of market structure on AMI mortality and the change in these effects are 
statistically insignificant.  
 
12.  The extension of Choice in 2008 did not change the effect of market structure and the effect of 
market structure did not vary with the proportion of patients who reported being aware of their 
right to a choice or being offered a choice.  
 
13.  The flexible model, in which the effect of market structure was allowed to vary across all years, 
suggested that the effect in 2002/3 of having more rivals was to increase mortality for AMI and hip 
fracture and that this detrimental effect became smaller over time.  The change in the effect of 
market structure started before the introduction of Choice in 2006.  The time series plot of the 
effects of market structure does not exhibit any obvious structural breaks in 2006/7 or in 2008/9 
following the extension of Choice.  Market structure did not affect stroke mortality in any year. 
 
14. AMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality probabilities fell by 2.65, 1.09, and 5.01 percentage points 
between 2002/3 and 2010/11. This implies that there were 661, 119, and 1165 fewer deaths from 
these conditions in 2010/11 than would have been the case in 2002/3. The beneficial changes in the 
patient mix and the effects of patient characteristics were the most important factors contributing 
to these reductions.  The reduction in the mortality contributed by the reduction in the detrimental 
effect of rivals was 1.15 percentage points for hip fracture and 0.37 percentage points for AMI. 
 
15. For AMI and hip fracture there was a reduction in the detrimental effect on mortality of having 
more rivals over the period 2002/3 to 2010/11. This did not appear to be due to the introduction of 
Choice.  We conjecture, and plan to test in future work, that the beneficial change in the effect of 
market structure was due to a combination of policies including the increase in the proportion of 
hospital revenue arising from prices rather than negotiated budgets. 
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1 Introduction 
The introduction of competition policies in the health care sector is the subject of an intense political 
and academic debate, both in England and internationally (Bevan and Skellern, 2011; Bloom et al, 
2011; 2012; Gaynor et al, 2012a; OHE, 2012; Pollock et al 2011a; 2011b).  It has been argued that if 
the price per patient treated is fixed then hospitals have an incentive to raise quality to attract more 
patients and that this incentive is greater if hospitals face more rivals and if patient choice amongst 
hospitals is not restricted.  
 
Since 2003 the English National Health Service (NHS) has been subject to policies intended, inter alia, 
to promote competition amongst hospitals.  Prospective payment for hospitals was introduced from 
2003/4 onwards, so that funding followed the patient.  Private providers were encouraged to enter 
the market for elective care for NHS patients from 2003. In January 2006 NHS patients were given 
the right to be offered a choice of at least four providers and from April 2008 they had the right to 
choose any qualified provider. An electronic booking service for outpatient appointments was 
introduced from 2006 to help patients and their GPs make a firm booking during a consultation.  
Since 2007 the NHS Choices website has provided public information on services and quality of 
providers. Whether these pro-competition reforms had a positive effect on quality in the NHS has 
implications for policy in England and other OECD countries that plan to encourage competition 
policies in the hospital sector (OECD, 2012). 
 
The empirical evidence on competition and hospital quality in fixed price systems is mixed. Most 
studies have used mortality for patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) as the quality 
measure because AMI is well recorded and mortality can be reduced by appropriate treatment.  
Moreover, because AMI is not an elective condition, the quality measure is not biased by 
unobservably sicker patients choosing higher quality providers.  But because hospitals can compete 
only for elective patients it must be assumed that quality of care for AMI (or other emergency 
admissions used to measure quality) is correlated with quality of care for elective patients.
1
   
 
For the US, Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Kessler and Geppert (2005) find that mortality for AMI 
is lower in more competitive markets.  Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) report that more 
competition reduced heart attack and pneumonia mortality for patients with some types of 
insurance but increased it for others. Shen (2003) finds mixed effects of competition.  Mukamel et al 
(2001) find no effect of market concentration on all-cause mortality.  Colla et al (2014) report that 
competition reduces AMI mortality rates, has no effect on quality for hip and knee replacements (as 
measured by 30-day emergency readmission rates) and reduces quality for dementia patients. Chou 
et al (2014) find that report cards on the quality of providers reduced CABG mortality for more 
severely ill patients in more competitive areas. 
 
In England, Propper et al (2004) report that providers facing more competition during the first NHS 
internal market in the 1990s had higher AMI mortality and Propper et al (2008) also find that when 
competition was allowed during this period, providers in more competitive areas had a slower rate 
of decline of AMI mortality.  Recent papers have examined competition in the new post 2002/3 NHS 
internal market. Bloom et al (2013) find that hospitals in more competitive areas had lower AMI 
mortality.  Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al (2013) use the introduction of Choice policy in 2006 
as a natural experiment, arguing that it would have a bigger effect for providers facing a more 
competitive market structure. Using 2002-2008 individual level data for AMI patients aged 39-100 
Cooper et al (2011) find that AMI mortality fell by 0.31 percentage points per year faster after the 
introduction of Choice in areas where competition was more intense by one standard deviation.  
                                                 
1
 See Cooper et al (2011), Gaynor et al (2013) for a detailed discussion of the justification of using AMI.  
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Gaynor et al (2013) use hospital Trust level data for 2003/4 and 2007/8.
2
 They find that hospitals 
which had a 10% smaller Herfindahl index (i.e. facing more competition) in 2003 had a 2.9% larger 
decrease in age 35-74 AMI mortality rates between 2003 and 2007. There was a similar association 
for overall mortality rates, though the effect was smaller. Hospitals facing more competition in 2003 
also had a reduction in overall length of stay between 2003 and 2007 relative to providers facing less 
competition.  
 
In this paper we use individual level data to investigate the effect of market structure on hospital 
quality between 2002/3 and 2010/11. We make a number of contributions. First, in addition to AMI 
mortality, we examine mortality for hip fracture and stroke. The lifetime risk of hip fracture in 
industrialised countries is 18% in women and 6% in men.  Around 30% of people with hip fracture 
die within one year (Roche et al, 2005).  Stroke causes 10-12% of deaths in the western world 
(Donnan et al, 2008). Average in-hospital age 35-74 mortality rates are 16% for stroke, 3% for hip 
fracture and 6% for AMI in our sample. There are low correlations (under 0.1) of hip fracture and 
stroke mortality with AMI mortality across hospitals (see section 4.1).  This suggests that market 
structure and Choice policy may have different effects in different conditions.  
 
Second, we use a longer panel for 2002/3 to 2010/11. This enables us to test if there was a change in 
the effect of market structure after 2006 and to examine whether there was a further change 
following the 2008 extension of Choice policy which gave patients the right to choose any qualified 
provider.  We also use the longer panel to test whether differences in the effect of markets structure 
before and after the introduction of Choice were part of a longer term trend and whether Choice led 
to changes in this trend.   
 
Third, in addition to models which assume that Choice policy had an immediate and uniform effect 
across providers from 2006 onward, we estimate models using cross sectional and time series 
differences in the proportion of patients in different areas who report being offered a choice of 
provider.  
 
Fourth, we examine whether the effect of market structure on mortality varies across age bands. 
Fifth, we test whether market structure and Choice have different effects on mortality at different 
types of hospitals (such as Foundation Trusts which, unlike other NHS hospitals, can retain profits).  
 
Last, but not least, we suggest that policy makers should be interested in the overall effect of market 
structure on quality, not just in how Choice policy may have changed this effect.  Consider Figures 1 
and 2, depicting two situations in which mortality depends on market structure as measured by the 
number of rivals and on Choice policy.  The introduction of Choice has the same beneficial effect in 
reducing mortality (by J1M  < 0) at any given number of rivals in the two figures.  In Figure 1 having 
more rivals leads to a reduction in mortality in both periods (į0 < 0, į0 + Ȗ1 < 0), whereas in Figure 
2 providers with more rivals have higher mortality (į0  > 0, į0 + Ȗ1 > 0).  In addition to knowing 
whether Choice changed the effect of market structure (Ȗ1), it is clearly important for policy makers 
to know whether more competitive market structure will lead to higher or lower mortality.  
 
To investigate these questions we use individual level data on AMI, hip fracture, and stroke patients 
admitted to English NHS hospitals between 2002/3 and 2010/11.  We measure market structure 
facing a hospital by (a) the number of sites (NHS and private) providing elective care within 30km 
and (b) the predicted equivalent number of rivals (the reciprocal of the Herfindahl index computed 
from predicted patient flows).  We allow for site fixed effects, year effects, and patient covariates 
including morbidity, age, gender, deprivation and distance to hospital. 
                                                 
2
 2002/3 etc are NHS financial years from April 1 to March 31. 
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Figure 1.  Effects of market structure and introduction of Choice on mortality: 
Choice increases beneficial effect of more competitive market structure 
Note. In the pre-Choice period providers faced with more rivals have lower mortality: q0 = E0 + G0M, where the marginal 
effect of more rivals G0  < 0.   In the post choice period mortality risk is q1 = E0  W + (G0 + J1)M,  where W  is the change in 
risk due to changes in all other factors and J1 <  0 is the change in the marginal effect of the number of rivals. Since G0 + J1 
< G0 < 0, an increase in the number of rivals reduces mortality both pre and post Choice and an increase in the number of 
rivals leads to a greater reduction in mortality post Choice. 
 
We estimate two main models.  The policy break model assumes that the effect of market structure 
is the same in the four pre Choice years (2002/3 to 2005/6) and the same in the five post Choice 
years (2006/7 to 2010/11), but possibly different from the effect in the pre-Choice years. The model 
provides a simple test for whether the effect of market structure changed after the introduction of 
Choice in 2006. We use it to investigate the robustness of findings to the precise definition of 
mortality, to the age range of patients, and whether the effect of market structure depends on the 
type of hospital and whether it is competition from NHS hospitals or private providers that affects 
quality.   
 
However, if there is an underlying trend in the effect of market structure, the policy break 
specification will incorrectly attribute all the difference between the average post Choice and the 
average pre Choice effect of market structure to the introduction of Choice.  Our second, flexible, 
model allows the effect of market structure to vary across all years, not just after the introduction of 
Choice, and so it avoids this problem.   
 
Results from the policy break model show that, in the pre Choice period, providers facing more rivals 
had higher AMI and hip fracture mortality, though the effects are statistically significant at the 
conventional 5% level only for hip fracture.  In the post Choice period the detrimental effect of rivals 
was smaller and statistically significant only for hip fracture. The reduction in the detrimental effect 
was significant for both AMI and hip fracture. This suggests that Choice reduced the detrimental 
effect of having more rivals.  Broadly similar results are obtained with mortality in any location, 
rather than just in-hospital mortality.  
 
0E   
0E W   
q 
Mortality  
W   
slope 0G : marginal effect of M 
pre Choice 
slope 0 1G J : marginal  
effect of M  post Choice 
Market structure M: number of rivals 
1 1MJ   
reduction in mortality at  
given M due to Choice 
1M   
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Figure 2. Effects of market structure and introduction of Choice on mortality: 
Choice reduces deleterious effect of more competitive market structure 
Note. In the pre-Choice period providers faced with more rivals have higher mortality: q0 = E0 + G0M, where the marginal 
effect of more rivals is G0 >0. In the post choice period mortality risk is q1 = E0  W + (G0 + J1)M  where W  is the change in 
risk due to changes in all other factors and J1 <  0 is the change in the marginal effect of the number of rivals. Since G0 > G0 
+ J1 > 0, an  increase in the number of rivals is less harmful (leads to a smaller increase in mortality) post Choice, even 
though increases in the number of rivals increase mortality in both periods (G0 + J1  > 0).  
 
The effects of market structure on AMI mortality before and after introduction of Choice did not 
differ between Foundation Trust and other hospitals. Post Choice, the deleterious effect of market 
structure on hip fracture mortality was smaller for Foundation Trusts but not for other sites.  For 
hospitals located in London there was no statistically significant difference in the effect of market 
structure pre and post Choice.   
 
The qualitative pattern of results is not sensitive to the measure of market structure, though effects 
are less precisely estimated when using the predicted equivalent number of rivals derived from 
estimated patient demand, perhaps because there is less variation in this measure.  Results are also 
sensitive to the age range of patients. For example, with all patients aged over 35, rather than the 
baseline age range of 35-74, the effects of market structure on AMI mortality and the change in 
these effects are statistically insignificant.  
 
When we employ direct measures of the extent to which patients were offered choice we find that 
hospitals with more rivals do not respond differently in areas where a higher proportion of patients 
reported being offered a choice of provider or of being aware of their right to be offered a choice. 
Neither do we find that there was any difference in the effect of having more rivals in the period 
from 2008/9 onwards when patients had a right to an unrestricted choice, compared to the period 
2006/7 to 2007/8 when patients had a more restricted choice of at least 4 providers.  
 
The flexible model, in which the effect of market structure is allowed to vary across all years, 
suggested that the effect in 2002/3 of having more rivals was to increase mortality for AMI and hip 
0E   
0E W   
q 
Mortality  
 
slope 0G : marginal effect 
of M pre Choice 
Market structure M: number of rivals 
W   
1 1MJ : reduction in mortality  
at given M due to Choice 
slope 0 1G J :  marginal effect 
 of M post Choice 
1M   
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fracture and that this detrimental effect became smaller over time.  The change in the effect of 
market structure started before the introduction of Choice in 2006.  The time series plot of the 
effects of market structure does not exhibit any obvious structural breaks in 2006/7 or in 2008/9 
following the extension of Choice.  Market structure did not appear to have any effect on stroke 
mortality. 
 
AMI, hip fracture, and stroke mortality probabilities for patients aged 35-74 fell by 2.65, 1.09, and 
5.01 percentage points between 2002/3 and 2010/11. This implies that there were 661, 119, and 
1165 fewer deaths from these conditions in 2010/11 than would have been the case in 2002/3. 
Beneficial changes in the patient mix and the effects of patient characteristics were the most 
important contributory factor in these reductions.  The reduction in the detrimental effect of rivals 
was more important for hip fracture (1.15 percentage points) than for AMI (0.37 percentage points).    
 
In the next section of the paper we sketch a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of the 
effects of market structure and of Choice. It shows that the assumptions required for Choice to have 
a beneficial impact on the effect of more rivals on quality are much stronger than those required for 
more rivals to increase quality. Section 3 sets out the econometric approach. Section 4 describes the 
institutional set up and the data.  Section 5 has the results and Section 6 discusses their implications.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
We provide a simple model to examine the implications of more competitive market structures and 
ŽĨƌĞŵŽǀŝŶŐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐƚŽŐƵŝĚĞŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůŵŽĚel.3   
 
Consider a market with n hospitals where the payoff function of hospital j is 
 
( , , ) ( ) ( , , ) ( ( , , ), )j j j j jj j j j j j j jv q q B q pD q q C D q q qT T T              (1) 
 
qj is the quality of hospital j, jq  is the vector of qualities of potential rival hospitals, ( )jB q  
 ( ) 0jqB q ! captures intrinsic provider motivation (McGuire, 2000). p is the price set by a regulator. 
Dj(qj,q-j,T) is demand for hospital j which is increasing in own quality and decreasing in the quality 
of its rivals. T  is a policy parameter which captures the degree to which patient choice is 
encouraged.  Cj(.) is the cost function which is increasing in the number of patients treated (CD > 
0) and in quality (Cq > 0).  We do not put restrictions on the cost function, and allow for increasing 
(CDD < 0, Cqq < 0) or decreasing (CDD >0, Cqq > 0) returns to scale in volume and quality, and 
cost complementarity (CqD < 0) or substitutability (CqD  > 0) between quality and volume.  Cost 
complementarity can arise in the presence of learning-by-doing so that the marginal cost of 
providing quality decreases with higher volumes.
4
   
 
 
When the market is in equilibrium all firms choose quality to satisfy the first and second order 
conditions 
     ( , , ) ( )j jq j j q jv q q B qT  ( ( , , ), ) ( , , )j j jD j j j q j jp C D q q q D q qT T ª º ¬ ¼  
                    
( ( , , ), )j jq j j jC D q q qT  = 0,  j  «n    (2)    
( ) ( 2 ) 0j j j j j j j j jqq qq D qq DD q Dq q qqv B p C D C D C D C       ,         j  «n         (3) 
 
If hospitals are identical and the equilibrium is symmetric, so that all hospitals choose the same 
quality q
e
, the market equilibrium is defined by the single condition 
 
  ( , , )e eqv q n T ( ) ( ( , , ), ) ( , , ) ( ( , , ), ) 0e e e e e e e e eq D q qB q p C D q n q D q n C D q n qT T Tª º     ¬ ¼    (4) 
where ( , , )e eD q n T  = ( , , )e e jD q q T . 
 
The effects of more competitive market structure (n) and choice policy (T) on equilibrium quality 
( , )eq n T
  are  
       
( , , ) ( ) ( )
( , , ) ( ) ( 2 )
e e e e
qn D qn DD Dq ne
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qq qq D qq DD q Dq q qq
v q n p C D C C D
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v q n B p C D C D C D C
T
T
                   (5) 
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e e e e
q D q DD Dqe
e e e e e
qq qq D qq DD q Dq q qq
v q n p C D C C D
q
v q n B p C D C D C D C
T T T
T
T
T
                   (6) 
                                                 
3
 See Gaynor (2006), Katz (2013), Brekke et al (2014) for reviews of the theoretical literature. 
4
 The model does not allow for profit constraints.  The literature suggests that profits constraints typically reduce the effect 
of competition on quality since providers are less responsive to financial incentives (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001; Brekke et 
al, 2012). In the English context this implies that Foundation Trusts should respond more to competition, since they have 
more discretion in managing surpluses.  Brekke et al (2012) show that in the presence of non-monetary benefits of quality, 
profit constraints reduce the marginal profitability from an increase in quality so that the increase in quality resulting from 
greater competition will be smaller. 
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where the expressions are evaluated at equilibrium quality qe(n,ߠ).  Since (3) implies that 0eqqv  , 
the effects of n and T depend on the numerators ,e eqn qv v T .  
 
If the price-cost margin is positive, and if more competing providers or more choice increase 
responsiveness of demand to quality ( 0, 0e eqn qD D T! ! ), then they will tend to increase quality via 
the first term in the numerators in (5) and (6). If the marginal cost of treatment is increasing in 
volume (CDD > 0) or the marginal cost of treatment is increasing in quality (CDq > 0), then the 
positive effects of n or T on quality due to a higher demand responsiveness to quality can be 
dampened if they also lead to higher aggregate demand for each hospital since the cost of treating 
additional patients is increased (Brekke et al, 2011).  Conversely if the marginal cost of treatment is 
decreasing in volume or in quality (due to for example to learning-by-doing effects), then the 
positive effects of n and T on quality are reinforced.  A larger number of providers implies that each 
hospital has a smaller share of total demand. But with more providers potential patients have less 
far to travel to a hospital, so that total demand could increase as more patients choose to be 
treated. Hence the sign of 
e
nD  is ambiguous. If giving patients greater choice from the set of 
providers leads some patients now decide to seek treatment in the NHS rather than going private or 
doing without care, then 0.eDT ! 5   
 
It has been argued (Gaynor et al, 2013; Cooper et al, 2011) that the introduction of Choice policy in 
2006 made the elective care market more competitive and that the effect on quality would be 
greater in areas where there were more competing providers. This argument is intuitively plausible, 
but it requires much stronger assumptions than are required for quality to be higher in markets with 
more competitive market structure (higher n).   
 
In terms of the model we are interested in the second order cross partial derivative of equilibrium 
quality ( , )enq nT T . Differentiating (5) with respect to ߠ gives 
    
 2
( ( , ), , )
( ( , ), , )
e e e e e e e ee e
qq qnq qn qn qqq qqqne
n e e e
qq qq
v v q v v v q vv q n n
q
v q n n v
T T T T
T
T T
T T T
  § ·w  ¨ ¸¨ ¸w © ¹
  
      
e e e e e e e e
qn qqn qq n qqq n
e
qq
v v q v q v q q
v
T T T T   
         (7) 
Signing the second order comparative static effects of the Choice policy on the effect of market 
structure on quality ( enq T ) requires assumptions about the third order cross partials of ( , , )e ev q n T .  
Predictions about the first order comparative static effects of n and T  ( enq , eqT ), only required 
assumptions about the second order cross partials.  Equation (7) shows that even if 
e
qnv   and 
e
qv T  
are both positive, which ensures that more competitive market structure and encouragement of 
choice both lead providers to increase quality ( enq  > 0, eqT  > 0), it is not in general true that 
encouragement of choice will have a bigger effect on quality in markets with more providers.   
 
                                                 
5
 Altruistic preferences alter and potentially reverse the positive effect of competition on quality. Re-writing (2) as 
( ) eD q q qp C D C B   , we see that sufficiently altruistic providers will be making a loss on the marginal patient.  This will 
reduce their willingness to increase quality to attract yet more unprofitable patients (Brekke et al, 2011; Siciliani et al, 
2013). 
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Consider a simple case in which benefit and demand are linear in quality ( 0qqB  , 0eqqD  ) and 
cost is separable and linear in quantity ( 0DDC  , qDC   0). Then   
 0eqq qqv C                 (8)   
and since    
 ( ) 0e eqn D qnv p C D  !                 (9) 
 ( ) 0e eq D qv p C DT T  !              (10) 
more providers and more choice increase quality. Consider now the terms in the numerator of (7) 
which determine the sign of 
e
nq T . The assumptions which gave clear and intuitive predictions about 
e
nq  and 
eqT  imply  
 
( )e eqn D qnv p C DT T               (11) 
2 0qqn Dq qnv C D                (12) 
2( ) 0eqq Dq q q Dqqv C D D C qT T T               (13) 
2eqqq q Dqq qqq qqqv D C C C                (14) 
and so 
1 [( ) ]e e e en D qn qqq ne
qq
q p C D C q q
v
T T T    .            (15) 
Thus, even with a positive price-cost margin, the plausible assumption that choice policy amplifies 
the effect of market structure on demand responsiveness to quality ( 0qnD T ! ) is not sufficient for 
the choice policy to increase the effect of market structure on equilibrium quality, i.e. for 0.enq T !  If 
the convexity of the cost function in quality is increasing in quality (Cqqq  > 0), then (15) is 
ambiguously signed.  
 
This simple model suggests that apparently plausible assertions about the effect of the number of 
rivals on quality and about this effect changes when greater choice is introduced rest on implicit 
assumptions about cost and demand functions, some of which are difficult to verify.  In general, 
having more rivals or more choice could increase or reduce quality, and having more choice could 
increase or reduce the impact of having more rivals.  Empirical analysis is thus required to both 
investigate the signs of these effects and their magnitude. 
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3 Econometric Specification 
We estimate separate models for each condition. Our first specification is the policy break 
specification  
 
         0 ( ) 0 1 1 1 2 22006/72005/6iht t t t ht ht iht ht h ihtttq M M X XE E G J M M P Hc c tcz       ¦ 1 1        (16) 
 
where qiht is equal to 1 if patient  i  treated in site h in year t (t =  «died in 
hospital within 30 days of admissions and zero otherwise.  Mht is the market structure facing site h 
in year t.  1ihtX  is a vector of individual-specific covariates, 2htX  is a vector of hospital-specific time-
varying covariates, hP  is a time invariant hospital site effect and ihtH  is an error term.   ( )t tc 1  is a 
year indicator variable equal to 1 in year tc and to 0 otherwise.  2006/7tt1  is the Choice policy 
indicator variable being equal to 0 in the four pre Choice years (2002/3 to 2005/6) and to 1 in the 
five post Choice years (2006/7 to 2010/11).  The effect of market structure is constrained to be the 
same (į0) in all pre Choice years and in all post Choice years (į0 + Ȗ1).  
 
This specification is similar, but not equivalent, to the standard Difference-in-Difference (DID) 
specification which compares the changes in outcomes before and after treatment for the treated 
and untreated. Here the treatment is the introduction of Choice policy (as represented by the 
indicator  2006/7tt1 ) but there is no clear distinction between treatment and control groups, given 
that all hospitals in England were exposed to the policy change.
6
    
 
Identification of Ȗ1 as the change in the effect of market structure due the introduction of Choice 
requires the assumption that market structure Mht affects the economic incentive to provide quality 
qiht. This assumption means that hospital were not equally affected by the policy change, so that the 
final effect of the Choice policy depended on the level of Mht.  A similar model has been used in Card 
(1992).
7
 
 
We focus on two policy relevant questions: what is the effect of market structure on mortality (į0 
and į0 + Ȗ1) and did the introduction of Patient Choice in 2006 change the relationship between 
market structure and quality (Ȗ1)?   
 
We estimate (16) as a linear probability panel model, with hospital site fixed effects, and standard 
errors which are robust to heteroscedasticity and to clustering of patients at hospital site level.
8
 We 
have a rich set of patient variables X1iht (see data section).  The year effects will account for common 
                                                 
6
 /ĨƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞǁĂƐďŝŶĂƌǇ ?ƐĂǇ “ŵĂŶǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ĨĞǁ ?ƌŝǀĂůƐ ?ĂŶĚŝĨŶŽŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?ŽƌŝĨǁĞ
define market structure as having many or few rivals in a particular year), then the specification would be identical to the 
standard DID: 
  0 ( ) 0 1 1 1 2 22006/7( ( ) ) ( ( ) )2005/6 o oiht t t t iht ht h ihttf f f ftq X XE E G J M M P Hc c tc t tz       ¦ ht htM M1 1 1 1   
where  ( ) of fthtM1 is an indicator for provider h ďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ “ŵĂŶǇ ?ƌŝǀĂůƐŐƌŽƵƉĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞƌƵůĞ f.   
7
 Card (1992) investigates the state by state effect of an increase in the Federal minimum wage on teenage employment, 
arguing that the effect would be greater in states with a higher proportion of the teenage workforce who were earning less 
than the Federal minimum in the previous period.   
8
 We also estimated (16) with unconditional logit maximum likelihood with hospital fixed effects. Since the number of 
hospital site clusters is around 200 in each year, and each cluster includes at least 100 patients, the coefficients of interest 
on market structure are likely to be unbiased according to Monte Carlo simulations results by Katz (2001), Coupé (2005) 
and Greene (2004). The qualitative results were very similar to those from the linear probability model (see Appendix Table 
A2).  
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secular changes and the site fixed effects will account for unobserved site time-invariant 
heterogeneity.  It is therefore reasonable to assume that the model will identify the effects of 
market structure pre Choice (į0) and post Choice (į0 + Ȗ1) and hence the change in the effect due 
to Choice (Ȗ1).  The model would also identify the change in the effect if the estimates of the pre 
and post Choice effects are biased to the same extent.  
 
The policy break specification assumes that Choice policy is fully described by the indicator function 
 2006/7tt1 , implying that the effect of Choice was the same in all post-Choice years and for all sites.   
Choice policy was extended in April 2008 when patients were given the right to choose any qualified 
provider.  We investigate whether this extension of Choice amplified the effects of the introduction 
of Choice in 2006 by estimating  
          0 ( ) 0 1 22006/7,2007/8 2009/102005/6iht t t t ht ht htt ttq M M ME E G J Jc c  cz t    ¦ 1 1 1  
           1 1 2 2iht ht h ihtX XM M P H         (17) 
 
We also have time and site varying measures of Choice policy Cht (see Section 4.5) for a subset of 
years and estimate  
   0 ( 2006/7) 0 0 1iht t t ht ht ht httq M C C C M ME E G Z Zc zc ª º      ¬ ¼¦ 1  
                    1 1 2 2iht ht h ihtX XM M P H         (18) 
 
where C  and M  are the overall means of Cht and Mht and t =  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?. This allows us 
to test both whether the amount of Choice (captured by Cht) changed the effect of market structure 
( enq T  in the theory model) and whether Cht had a direct effect on mortality ( enq in the theory 
model).   
 
The policy break specification imposes the constraint that the effects of market structure are the 
same in all pre Choice periods and all post Choice periods.  This simplifies presentation of results and 
robustness tests (for example whether the effect of market structure is different for hospitals based 
in London), but it has the disadvantage that it could lead to misleading conclusions about the effect 
of Choice if there are underlying trends in the effects of market structure on mortality.   For 
example, if there was a trend reduction in the effect of market structure over the whole period 
2002/3 to 2010/11, then this could produce a significant estimated difference in the effect of market 
structure before and after Choice. However, this effect would not be due to Choice, but rather to 
fitting a step function to an underlying trend. 
 
Our second main model is the flexible specification  
  0 ( ) 02005/6 2005/6iht t t t ht t ht t tt tq M ME E G Jc c c c cz z   ¦ ¦1 1  
            1 1 2 22005/6 2005/6t iht t ht h ihtt t t tt tX XM M P Hc c  c cz z   ¦ ¦1 1      (19) 
 
with time invariant site fixed effects.  The specification allows the effect of market structure (į0 in 
2005/6 and į0 + Ȗt in other years) and of the covariates to vary across all years. It provides a more 
rigorous test for whether the introduction of Choice in 2006/7 altered the relationship between 
market structure and mortality risk.  It controls for any underlying trends in the effect of market 
structure before and after the implementation of the Choice policy. A similar specification was used 
in Propper et al (2008) to investigate changes in the effect of market structure on AMI mortality in 
the first NHS internal market.  
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4 Data 
4.1 Institutional background    
The NHS provides universal access to healthcare, funded by taxation and free to patients at point of 
use. Geographically-defined local health authorities receive budgets from the Department of Health 
to purchase health care for their populations. Most NHS hospital care is provided by public hospitals, 
which are separate from local purchasing bodies.  NHS hospitals are public bodies (Hospital Trusts) 
which are subject to tight financial and regulatory control.  Some are Foundation Trusts which do not 
have to break even, have discretion in use of surpluses, and can borrow from the capital market. 
They are also less constrained in staff remuneration and can invest in buildings, and manage their 
own assets (Marini et al, 2007).  Foundation Trusts may therefore respond more to competition. 
Foundation Trusts status was introduced in 2004 and by 2010 60% of NHS trusts were Foundation 
Trusts. About 20% of the NHS hospitals have Teaching status, undertaking additional activities 
including teaching and research, and treating more complex patients.  From 2003 private sector 
providers have been able to enter the NHS market.  By 2010/11 they treated (4%) of NHS elective 
patients (Hawkes, 2012).  
 
4.2 Data sources 
We examine the effects of market structure and Choice on quality of care provided by sites 
belonging to NHS Trusts for three categories of emergency patients.   Our main data source is 
Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) for financial years 2002/3 to 2010/11. HES has information on all 
admissions to NHS providers and all NHS-funded hospital admissions to private providers.
9
  HES 
includes information on the hospital trust and the site within the trust at which care was provided, 
the ownership of the provider (public or private), and whether Foundation Trust (FT) status has been 
achieved.
10
 Teaching Hospital status was retrieved from the NHS Patient Safety website.
11
  
 
Each HES record is for a finished consultant episode (FCE) for a patient whilst under the care of a 
specific hospital consultant. We link FCEs for the same patient to form continuous inpatients spells 
(CIPS), which cover all FCEs within the same spell and include transfers between hospitals.    
 
HES information on patients includes age, gender, the Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) of residence, 
dates of admission and discharge, discharge method (dead or alive), and detailed information on 
ICD10 diagnoses and treatments.
12
 Information on deaths after discharge is held by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) and is linked to HES records.
13
  
  
We measure straight line distances between hospital sites using TRUD data for postcodes and an 
ONS look up table between postcodes geographic coordinates.  Straight line distances between 
patients and sites are measured from the centroid of the LSOA where the patient resides.  
 
                                                 
9
 HES distinguishes between two types of private (non-NHS) providers treating NHS patients.  Independent Sector 
Treatment Centres (ISPCs), often co-located with NHS hospitals, specialise in common elective treatments such as hip 
replacement or cataract surgery.  Independent Providers are generally larger and treat a wider range of patients, both NHS 
and private.  The HES classification of the two types is poorly coded and so we categorise both as private.  
10
 Information on the address of the trust and of the site is from TRUD (Technology Reference data Update Distribution) 
and linked to HES. TRUD is a service provided by NHS Information Centre (HSCIC). 
11
 http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/?entryid45=135255 
12
 There are 32,482 Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in England. They have a mean population of around 1600. 
13
 http://www.hscic.gov.uk/article/2677/Linked-HES-ONS-mortality-data. 
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4.3 Quality  
Most NHS hospitals treat both emergency and elective (non-emergency) patients.  We follow the 
empirical literature on hospital competition and quality by measuring hospital quality for emergency 
patients.  Using measures of the quality of elective care creates possible selection bias.  Patients who 
are unobservably sicker pre-treatment are more likely to select hospitals they perceive as higher 
quality, thereby biasing measured quality downward. Emergency patients do not choose their 
provider and so emergency quality is not subject to selection bias. However, since hospitals can only 
compete for elective patients, the use of emergency quality measures is sensible only if emergency 
and elective quality are positively correlated.  Such correlation may occur if quality in all 
departments is influenced by the overall managerial quality of the hospital (Bloom et al, 2013) or if 
investments in information systems or capital equipment, such as MRI scanners, raises quality across 
the hospital.
14
   
 
We measure quality as mortality for AMI, hip fracture and stroke patients aged at least 35 with an 
emergency admission at an NHS hospital site with at least 100 admissions per year for their 
condition.
15
  We focus on patients aged 35 to 74.
16
 These patients have lower mortality rates than 
older patients but their risk of death is likely to be more responsive to interventions by hospitals.
17
 
Preventing premature deaths in people under 75 years is a domain of the NHS Outcomes 
Framework.   
 
To reduce mis-coding we exclude patients with a length of stay of 2 days or less who were 
discharged alive. Our main patient level quality indicator is whether the patient died in hospital 
within 30 days of admission. We also use an indicator for whether the patient died inside or outside 
the hospital within 30 days of admission.  We assign patients who were transferred to another site 
during their spell to the first site of their spell since patients are usually treated and stabilised in the 
Emergency Department of the first provider. 
 
There were around 30,000 admissions aged 35-74 per year for AMI, 24,000 for stroke and 10,000 for 
hip fracture (see Table 1). The number of AMI and stroke admissions fell between 2002/3 and 
2010/11, whilst hip fracture admissions increased.  Average in-hospital 30-day mortality rates for 
this age group were 6% for AMI, 3% for hip fracture, and 16% for stroke. ONS 30-day mortality rates 
were higher (8%, 6% and 20% for AMI, hip fracture and stroke).   In-hospital mortality rates for all 
three conditions declined between 2002/3 and 2010/11.  The trends for in-hospital raw 
(unconditional) mortality rates are shown in Figure 3 for patients aged 35-74 and in Figure 4 for 
patients aged over 35.  
                                                 
14
 Gravelle et al (2014) report that 16 quality indicators for emergency and elective conditions and patient satisfaction are 
not highly correlated for English Trusts in 2009/10 and often not correlated at all.  
15
 ICD10 codes: I21-I22 for AMI; S720-S721 for hip fracture; I60-I64, G46, I672, I698, R470 for stroke.   NHS Community and 
Mental Health Trusts treat some AMI, stroke or hip-fracture emergency patients but are excluded because they do reach 
the volume threshold for our analysis. 
16
 Very few AMI, hip fracture, or stroke patients are under 35.  
17
 See the large literature on amenable mortality, stimulated by Rutstein (1976), and reviewed in Castelli and Nizalova 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?EŽůƚĞĂŶĚDĐ<ĞĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞŝƌƐƚƵĚǇƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŶĚ ǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂŐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌ ? ? “ƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
extent to which deaths at older ages can be prevented by health care and about the reliability of death certificates for 
ŽůĚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĚŝƐĞĂƐĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ? 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics - patients 35 to 74 years old 
 
AMI sample Hip Fracture sample Stroke sample 
  mean sd min max mean sd min max mean sd min max 
Providers 
            
N rival sites - 30 km 12.15 15.04 0 76 13.63 16.80 0 76 14.40 17.51 0 76 
N rival trusts - 30 km 5.61 6.78 0 28 6.16 7.41 0 28 6.55 7.72 0 28 
1/predicted HHI 30km  2.69 1.35 1.09 8.76 2.81 1.45 1.09 9.47 2.87 1.47 1.09 8.83 
N rival NHS sites - 30 km 11.34 14.45 0 66 12.62 16.08 0 66 13.43 16.81 0 66 
N rival ISP sites - 30 km 0.81 1.58 0 12 10.01 1.79 0 12 0.97 1.79 0 12 
N patients treated per year 229 106 1 624 70 28 1 177 157 64 1 359 
NHS Trust
1
 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Teaching Trust
1
 0.16 0.36 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Foundation Trust
1
 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.28 0.45 0 1 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Patients 
            
In-hospital 30-day mortality 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 
ONS 30-day mortality 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Patient age 61.18 9.38 35 74 64.84 8.74 35 74 62.74 9.52 35 74 
Female Patient 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.63 0.48 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1 
N diagnoses 4.66 2.67 1 20 5.01 2.72 1 20 4.82 2.82 1 20 
Charlson index 0.69 1.10 0 14 0.75 1.26 0 13 0.81 1.28 0 13 
Distance to provider 12.86 30.65 0 607 13.54 32.36 0 572 12.06 27.32 0 610 
IMD income  0.16 0.12 0 0.96 0.16 0.12 0 0.96 0.17 0.13 0 0.96 
IMD environment 21.39 16.59 0.08 94 22.02 16.72 0.08 94 22.67 16.98 0.13 94 
Incapacity claims 0.0387 0.0252 0 0.2519 0.0388 0.0263 0 0.2519 0.0391 0.0255 0 0.2519 
Disability claims 0.0579 0.0305 0 0.2491 0.0571 0.0313 0 0.2491 0.0574 0.0305 0 0.2491 
Notes. Number of sites with at least 100 patients: AMI 238; Hip Fracture; 213; Stroke 236. Number of patients aged 35 to 74 years: 288,287 (AMI); 91,005 (Hip Fracture); 214,103 (Stroke). All 
years 2002/3  ? 2010/11.  1 Indicator = 1/0 if site belongs/does not belong to NHS Trust with this characteristic. ISP = Independent Sector Provider.
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Figure 3. In hospital mortality rates, patients aged 35-74 years 
 
 
Figure 4. In hospital mortality rates, patients aged over 35 years 
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Table 2 reports the correlations amongst risk adjusted mortality for the three conditions.
18
 The 
correlations at Trust and at site level over the whole sample period 2002/3-2010/11 are positive and 
significant, but below 10% in magnitude.  This suggests that the effects of market structure and 
Choice on mortality may differ across the three conditions.  
 
Table 2. Correlation of risk adjusted mortality across sites and trusts 2002/3-2010/11 
 Trust level 
correlation 
N trust 
observations 
Site level 
correlations 
N sites 
observations 
AMI & hip fracture 0.0959*** 1284 0.0700*** 1479 
AMI & stroke 0.0599** 1298 0.0769*** 1569 
Hip fracture & stroke 0.0481* 1312 0.0483* 1535 
Notes. Correlations for Trusts (sites) are over all Trust (site) by year observations where Trust (site) had at least 100 cases 
for both conditions.  Adjusted mortality for Trusts (sites) is the ratio of actual to expected mortality, where expected 
mortality is predicted from an individual level logit model with age, gender, Charlson Index co-morbidities, number of 
diagnosis, seasonality factors (day of week, admission month, admission year).  
 
4.4 Market structure  
NHS Hospital Trusts can have more than one site providing care for AMI, hip fracture and stroke 
patients. In our sample there are 238 sites and 165 Trusts for AMI patients, 213 sites and 160 Trusts 
for hip fracture patients, and 236 sites and 163 Trusts for stroke patients.  In most of our analysis we 
examine the effect on competition facing the site on site quality, but we also test whether 
competition measured at Trust level affects site quality. We measure market structure in two ways: 
the number of rival providers within a specified distance and the predicted equivalent number of 
providers.  
 
Count of rival providers.  Since many providers have several sites, we count for each year for each 
hospital site providing care for AMI, hip fracture, or stroke patients, the number of rival 
organisations (NHS Trusts or chains of private providers) with at least one site within 30km and with 
at least 100 HES elective patients in that year.
19, 20
  
 
Predicted equivalent number of sites. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for a market is the sum 
of the square of provider market shares. For a market with N firms it varies between 1 (monopoly) 
and 1/N (when all firms have the same share). The reciprocal of the HHI is the equivalent number of 
equal sized firms which would yield the same HHI.  Given the spatial dispersion of patients and 
providers, patients in different locations face different choice sets of providers and providers face 
different sets of potential patients and rivals.  We follow Kessler and McClellan (2000) and 
subsequent papers by using a provider level measure of competition derived from the HHI but 
adapted to spatially dispersed markets.  
 
The HHI for patients in LSOA j is the sum of the squared shares of their elective admissions at the 
providers they use.  It is a measure of the amount of choice they have amongst elective care 
providers.  We compute the HHI for site h as a weighted average of the HHIs for patients in LSOAs 
within k km of site h: 
                                                 
18
 Risk adjusted mortality is the ratio of actual to predicted deaths. Predicted deaths were computed from logit models 
with explanatories including age, gender, number of diagnoses, Charlson index, the day of the week and month of year 
admitted, year of admission, IMD income deprivation.  In the models testing for effects of market structure and Choice we 
use the same dependent variable but add measures of market structure, Choice, site fixed effects, and year dummies.   
19
 We also constructed counts of rivals within radii of 20, 40 and 50 km. 
20
 We consider only booked and waiting list patients. The third category of planned electives is not included as their 
admissions are part of a planned course of treatment (for example, patients on dialysis, or cancer patients on a course of 
chemotherapy).  
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2k k k kh j hj jhjkjj hhHHI HHI s ss ccª º u  u« »¬ ¼¦ ¦¦   (20) 
where j=1«- indexes English LSOAs, kjhs  is the proportion of patients from LSOA j treated at a 
site h within k km of their LSOA,  khjs is the proportion of site h patients from LSOA j within k km of 
site h.   
 
^ŝŶĐĞ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŵĂǇ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ĨŽƌĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ Đare, computing khHHI  from 
observed use of providers may mean that any correlation between provider quality and 
k
hHHI  is 
due to reverse causation from quality to market structure. To remove this source of bias we 
compute predicted HHIs derived from models of patient choice of provider (NHS or private) for 
elective care in which choice is not allowed to depend on quality.  
 
We estimate a discrete choice model for elective care for each year. Given the large number of 
elective patients, we estimate Poisson choice models with the number of patients njht from LSOA j 
choosing provider h in year t having conditional mean  
 
       ^ `2 21 2 1 2| , , exp X Xjht j jh ht jt t jh t jh ht t jh ht t jh ht tn d X d d X d X d X[ [ O O O O O(              (21) 
 
where djh is the distance from the centroid of LSOA j to hospital site h and Xht is a vector of 
dummies for hospital characteristics (NHS or private, belonging to a Foundation Trust, belonging to a 
teaching Trust, located in London).  The model yields the same estimated coefficients as the 
conditional logit model (Guimaraes et al, 2003; Guimaraes, 2004), but it is faster to estimate.
21
   
 
The predicted Ö jhtn from (21) are used to compute the predicted shares Ö Ö Ö/kjht jht jhths n n ¦  and 
Ö Ö Ö/khjt jht jhtjs n n ¦ , which are then used in (20), instead of the actual flows, to compute the 
predicted HHI indices at given radii.  
  
Since the reciprocal of the HHI is the number of equal sized firms which would yield the HHI, we use 
the reciprocal of the predicted HHI as the measure of competition facing a provider. The models are 
estimated for choice of elective provider within 30km of the LSOA centroid, to preserve consistency 
with the count of rival providers within 30 km.
22
 Around 75% of booked or waiting list elective 
patients use a provider within 30km. We also computed market structure measures based on 
models for choice of provider within 100km (around 90% of booked or elective waiting list patients 
use a provider within 100km).  
 
Our analysis differs from Gaynor et al (2013) in that we examine choices by patients located in 
32,482 LSOAs rather than 6781 Medium Super Output Areas.  It also differs from Cooper et al (2011) 
in that we use choices of provider for all types of elective care, rather than aggregating results from 
separate choice models for five high volume procedures.
23
  
                                                 
21
 We also estimated patient choice models including patient characteristics. The results were very similar, in terms of 
predicted patient flows, to those from a model with no patient characteristics apart from distance to provider.   
22
 Appendix Table D1 provides the estimates of the Poisson choice models for elective secondary care within 30 km from 
ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?>^KŽĨƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? 
23
 Cooper et al (2011) use general practices rather than LSOAs to compute HHIs.  Having computed  HHIh they then 
compute a HHI for each general practice as the weighted average of the HHIh  where the weights are the predicted share of 
practice patients at each provider h.  Thus their measure of market structure varies with the practice of the patient, not 
with the hospital they were treated in.  This has the peculiar implication that two patients who are treated by the same 
provider, and are identical except that they are registered with different practices, have different predicted mortality.  
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Table 3. Correlation among competition measures (all years: 2002-2010) 
 1/(actual HHI 
30km) 
1/(predicted 
HHI 30km) 
1/(actual 
HHI 
100km) 
1/(predicted 
HHI 100km) 
N rival sites 
30km 
N rival trusts 
30km 
Average N 
rival sites 
30km 
1/(actual HHI 30km) 1       
1/(predicted HHI 30km) 0.7996 1      
1/(actual HHI 100km) 0.9092 0.6291 1     
1/(predicted HHI 100km) 0.816 0.9833 0.6547 1    
N rival trusts 30km 0.6944 0.7936 0.5513 0.8412 1   
N rival trusts 30km 0.6876 0.8109 0.5338 0.8522 0.9756 1  
Average N rival sites 30km 0.6704 0.7604 0.5364 0.8106 0.9506 0.9268 1 
Notes. Predicted HHIs are computed from a Poisson choice model using patient-provider distances and and hospital characteristics except quality. All correlations significant at 99% 
confidence level. Average number of rival sites computed as the yearly average of the number of sites belonging to a same trust.
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Our two main competition measures, the predicted equivalent number of equally-sized sites 
(1/predicted HHI 30km) and the count of number of rival sites (or trusts) within 30km of a site are 
highly correlated (0.79). The number of rival sites is very highly correlated with the number of rival 
trusts (0.98; see Table 3). Figures 5 and 6 map our two measures of market structure (measured by 
the number of rivals and the inverse predicted Herfindhal index) at the beginning (2002/03) and end 
(2010/11) of our sample.  Unsurprisingly there is greater competition in large urban conurbations 
such as London, Birmingham, Manchester, Newcastle and Bristol. Both measures of the 
competitiveness of the market structure increased over the period: from 12.24 to 18.1 rival sites 
within 30km faced by a site and from 2.64 to 3.65 for the predicted equivalent number within 30km.  
 
 
Figure 5. Number of rival sites within 30km in 2002/03, 2010/11 
 
The inverse predicted HHI appears conceptually to be a better measure of market structure.  The 
count of rivals assumes that having an additional rival 1km away will have the same effect as having 
a rival 30km away.  Nor does it take account of whether the additional rival is large or small.  This 
seems intuitively implausible.  The inverse predicted HHI is based on patient flows predicted from a 
model of patient choice of provider in which providers further away from patients attract fewer 
patients.  Thus it takes account of the size and location of possible rivals. But the predicted 
equivalent number of rivals has a much smaller coefficient of variation (0.50) than the count of rivals 
(1.24).  Possibly because of this, models with the simple count of rivals have slightly better overall 
goodness of fit for AMI and hip fracture and have more of the estimated effects of market structure 
being statistically significant. 
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Figure 6. Equivalent predicted number of rival sites within 30km in 2002/03, 2010/11 
 
4.5 Measures of choice policy  
In most models we assume, in common with Cooper et al (2011) and Gaynor et al (2013), that 
Choice policy affected all providers immediately from its introduction in 2006. Thus we distinguish 
the pre and post Choice policy periods by a dummy variable taking the value 0 for years up and 
including 2006/7 and the value 1 from 2006/7 onwards.   
 
We also use measures of Choice policy which vary over time and across providers.  National Patient 
Choice Surveys were conducted between May/June 2006 and February 2010.  The surveys provide 
information on the proportion of patients in each of 151 PCTs reporting that they were offered a 
choice of provider by their GP and on the proportion reporting that they were aware that they had a 
choice of provider. We assign these variables to sites providing AMI, hip fracture and stroke by the 
PCT in which they were located. We then estimate specification (18) to test whether the effect of 
market structure on quality is stronger for providers where a higher proportion of patients report 
being offered a choice or being aware that they had a choice.   
 
4.6 Patient covariates 
We have a very detailed set of patient level covariates available from HES: age in years, age in ten 
year bands, gender, number of diagnoses, Charlson index, source of admission (home, nursing 
home, temporary location), type of stroke (haemorragic, infarction, occlusion, unspecified, and 
other), type of hip fracture (pertrochanteric, subtrochanteric, unspecified),  day of the week and 
month of year admitted. We also attribute to each patient the IMD income deprivation, IMD 
environment deprivation, incapĂĐŝƚǇ ďĞŶĞĨŝƚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƌĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƌĂƚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
LSOA of residence. Finally, we also have a straight line measure of the distance from their LSOA 
centroid to the treatment site.  
  
20  CHE Research Paper 106 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Policy Break specification 
In this section we report the results from the Policy Break specification where models contain the 
full set of patient and provider covariates, site fixed effects and year effects. The year and covariate 
effects are very similar across models and are therefore omitted from the tables (the full results are 
available in Appendix Table A1).  
 
5.1.1 Baseline model  
Table 4 reports results from our baseline policy break specification (16) in which we interact a 
measure of market structure with a policy break indicator taking the value of 1 from 2006/7 
onwards.   Before the introduction of Choice policy in 2005/6 AMI and hip fracture mortality was 
higher in providers in more competitive markĞƚƐ ?ɷ0 > 0), though whether the effect was statistically 
significant for AMI even at 10% depends on the measure of market structure.  The absolute 
magnitude of the effect of market structure is larger for the reciprocal of the predicted HHI than for 
the number of rivals count, in part because the mean of the number of rivals is over four times as 
large as the mean of 1/pHHI.  After the introduction of Choice the detrimental marginal effect of 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ŽŶ ŵŽƌƚĂůŝƚǇ ǁĂƐ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ ĨŽƌ D/ ĂŶĚ ŚŝƉ ĨƌĂĐƚƵƌĞ  ?ɷ0 A? ɶ1 AM ɷ0).  Post-Choice, the 
detrimental effect of more rivals was positive and significant at 5% only for hip fracture when 
market structure was measured by the number of rival sites. The change in the effect of market 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƉŽƐƚŚŽŝĐĞ ?ɶ1) was significant for AMI and for hip fracture for both measures of market 
structure. 
 
Table 4. Effect of market structure on mortality pre and post Choice  
 AMI Hip-fracture Stroke 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Market structure measure: Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 
30km 
Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.0016 0.0007* 0.0048** 0.0010*** 0.0044 0.0002 
 
(0.80) (1.78) (2.29) (3.24) (1.22) (0.46) 
PolBk*Rivals (J1)  -0.0025** -0.0003** -0.0025** -0.0003*** 0.0012 -0.0000 
 
(-2.21) (-2.43) (-2.39) (-3.25) (0.73) (-0.32) 
Rivals post Choice (G0+J1)  -0.001 0.0004 0.0024 0.0007*** 0.0056* 0.0002 
 
(-0.65) (1.18) (1.43) (2.75) (1.85) (0.43) 
       
F-stat  93.74  95.14  39.80  40.05  141.73  141.56 
Adjusted R^2 0.0405 0.0405 0.0472 0.0473 0.0888 0.0887 
Patients 288287 288287 91005 91005 214103 214103 
Sites 238 238 213 213 236 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Period: 2002/3-2010/11 
(financial years). Market structure measured at site level. Equivalent N rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI). PolBk: indicator for 
2006/7 onwards.  All models include site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. t-statistics in parentheses;    p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 
For stroke, there was a positive but insignificant effect of market structure on mortality before 
Choice. After Choice, there was a small and insignificant increase in the positive effect of market 
structure and the effect was significant only with one of the market structure measures and then 
only at the 10% level.  
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The estimates in Table 4 suggest that the post Choice change in the effect of market structure for a 
provider with the average number of post Choice equivalent rivals ((Ȗ1M1 in Figures 1 and 2) 
reduced the probability of death post Choice for AMI patients by 0.73 percentage points [95% CI: -
1.38, -0.08].
24
 Thus the mean probability of death in the post-policy period fell from 5.35% to 4.62% 
for a hospital facing the average number of competitors. For hip fracture patients the reduction was 
0.74 percentage points [95% CI: -1.34, -0.13] compared with the mean probability post Choice of 
2.74%.  Applied to the average annual number of patients in the post Choice period these mortality 
risk reductions suggest that the change in the effect of market structure reduced the annual number 
of AMI deaths by 208 [95% CI: -392, -23]  and hip fracture deaths by 77 [95% CI: -140, -14].
25
 The 
effect of the change in the policy on probability of death for stroke patients is insignificant. 
 
5.1.2 30-day mortality in or outside hospital 
Table 5 has results from the baseline specification but with mortality defined as death inside or 
outside hospital within 30 days of admission.  The pattern of results is similar to those from models 
using 30 day in-hospital mortality.  The effects of the number of rivals on mortality are positive pre 
and post Choice, though significant at 5% only for hip fracture pre Choice using the equivalent 
number of rivals.  There is a statistically significant reduction in the detrimental effect of the number 
of rivals post Choice for AMI and hip fracture, though only at 10% for AMI with the simple count of 
rivals.   
  
Table 5. Effect of market structure on 30-days mortality in or outside hospital (ONS) 
 
AMI Hip-fracture Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Market structure measure: Equivalent 
N rival 
sites 30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent 
N rival 
sites 
30km 
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.0026 0.0004 0.0067** 0.0007 0.0045 0.0003 
 
(1.21) (1.10) (2.01) (1.55) (1.16) (0.49) 
PolBk*Rivals (J1)  -0.0026** -0.0002* -0.0055*** -0.0004*** 0.0010 -0.0000 
 
(-2.26) (-1.89) (-3.71) (-3.09) (0.57) (-0.31) 
Rivals post Choice (G0+J1)  0.000 0.0002 0.0012 0.0003 0.0055* 0.0002 
 
(0.00) (0.61) (0.45) (0.76) (1.67) (0.47) 
       
F-stat  129.22  129.26  78.81  77.89  174.43  177.15 
Adjusted R^2 0.0561 0.0561 0.0974 0.0973 0.0833 0.0833 
Patients 288287 288287 91005 91005 214103 214103 
Sites 238 238 213 213 236 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital or outside hospital within 30 days of admission. Period: 
2002/3-2010/11 (financial years).  PolBk: indicator for 2006/7 onwards.  Equivalent N rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI). 
Otherwise same specification as models in Table 3. t-statistics in parentheses;  p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
 
5.1.3 Age specific mortality 
In Table 6 we report results from policy break models estimated separately for different age bands. 
The effects of market structure are clearly sensitive to the age band. For AMI, the effect of market 
structure is statistically significant at 5% (and deleterious) only for the 35-44 age group.  The 
deleterious effect is smaller post Choice for all age bands up to 94 but the reduction is significant 
only for those aged 65-74 and 85-94. When all patients aged 35 and over are included and the effect 
                                                 
24
 This is computed by multiplying Ȗ1= - 0.002536 with average market structure in the post-policy period M1 = 2.8749. 
25
 All computations based on regressions results and statistics for the treated patients aged 35 to 74 years old. 
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of market structure is constrained to be the same for all age groups, market structure has no 
significant effect pre or post Choice and the change in the effect is not significant.  
 
Table 6. Effect of market structure and Choice on mortality by age band 
AMI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
35-44  45-54  55-64  65-74  75-84  85-94  95+  35+ 
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.0083** 0.0011 -0.0004 0.0020 0.0012 0.0038 -0.0341 0.0012 
 
(2.15) (0.43) (-0.14) (0.51) (0.23) (0.45) (-1.48) (0.43) 
PolBk*Rivals (J1)  
 
-0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0014 -0.0043** -0.0008 -0.0068** 0.0096 -0.0019 
(-0.49) (-1.64) (-0.91) (-2.09) (-0.36) (-1.98) (0.88) (-1.34) 
Rivals post Choice (G0+J1)  0.0074** -0.001 -0.0017 -0.0023 0.0004 -0.003 -0.0245 -0.0006 
 (2.24) (-0.53) (-0.82) (-0.76) (0.1) (-0.43) (-1.3) (-0.28) 
         
F-stat  4.22  14.01  27.70  47.56  72.83  29.59  6.37  259.20 
Adjusted R^2 0.0150 0.0209 0.0232 0.0295 0.0251 0.0223 0.0335 0.0762 
Patients 17350 52951 93207 124779 153650 82656 6618 531211 
Sites 237 238 238 238 238 238 233 238 
Hip Fracture 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
35-44 45-54 55-64  65-74 75-84  85-94  95+  35+  
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.0070 -0.0006 0.0038 0.0059* 0.0056** 0.0021 0.0214** 0.0048** 
 
(1.22) (-0.12) (1.29) (1.91) (2.29) (0.55) (2.34) (2.08) 
PolBk*Rivals (J1)  
 
-0.0032 -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0037** -0.0040*** -0.0009 0.0001 -0.0020* 
(-1.34) (-1.00) (0.04) (-2.52) (-3.26) (-0.54) (0.03) (-1.96) 
Rivals post Choice (G0+J1)  0.0038 -0.0029 0.0039 0.0022 0.0017 0.0012 0.0215*** 0.0028 
 (0.89) (-0.74) (1.59) (0.92) (0.86) (0.39) (2.9) (1.48) 
         
F-stat  0.70  2.98  11.07  31.49  93.34  117.98  3.08  197.23 
Adjusted R^2 0.0307 0.0602 0.0468 0.0444 0.0537 0.0608 0.0569 0.0706 
Patients 3612 8376 22558 56459 172025 173047 23595 459672 
Sites 211 213 213 213 214 213 213 214 
Stroke 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85-94 95+ 35+ 
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.0115 0.0148** -0.0011 0.0036 0.0089* 0.0072 0.0106 0.0069* 
 
(1.18) (2.19) (-0.26) (0.69) (1.90) (1.04) (0.64) (1.88) 
PolBk*Rivals (J1)  
 
-0.0038 -0.0037 0.0013 0.0029 0.0037* 0.0041 0.0146* 0.0029 
(-0.81) (-1.21) (0.63) (1.23) (1.75) (1.24) (1.80) (1.64) 
Rivals post Choice (G0+J1)  0.0077 0.0111* 0.0002 0.0066 0.0126*** 0.0113** 0.0252* 0.0099*** 
 (1.01) (1.93) (0.05) (1.48) (2.97) (1.99) (1.75) (2.99) 
         
F-stat  28.40  44.75  69.41  115.86  175.55  162.75  29.04  417.92 
Adjusted R^2 0.0764 0.1010 0.0932 0.0861 0.0890 0.0884 0.0849 0.1127 
Patients 12876 29610 58993 112624 195644 128295 12160 550202 
Sites 234 236 236 236 236 236 235 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient died in hospital within 30 days of admission.  Policy break: indicator for 2006/7 
onwards.  Market structure: Equivalent N rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI).  Years: 2002/3 to 20010/11.  All models contain 
year effects, site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates.   t-statistics in parentheses; p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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For hip fracture, results again vary across age bands. More rivals pre Choice increases mortality 
significantly (at 5%) for two age bands and for all patients over 35.  After the introduction of Choice, 
the deleterious effect of market structure on mortality decreased significantly for patients aged 65-
74 and 75-84. The overall effect of market structure on hip-fracture patients over 35 is positive and 
significant before Choice policy, and still positive but not significant after 2006. 
 
Having more rivals increases stroke mortality pre Choice for all age bands but the effect is significant 
at 5% only for those aged 45-54. This detrimental effect is reinforced in the post Choice period for 
older patients and more rivals increases mortality significantly all patients 35+ and for two of the 
older age bands (75-84 and 85-94).  
 
5.1.4 Alternative measures of Choice policy 
Table 7 is similar to our baseline specifications of Choice policy in assuming that Choice policies had 
immediate effects, but it distinguishes between the two phases of Choice policy: 2006/7 and 2007/8 
when patients had to be offered a choice of at least 4 providers and 2008/9 onwards when they had 
the right to choose any qualified provider. Before the introduction of Choice providers in more 
competitive areas had significantly higher hip fracture mortality (G0 = 0.0051**). The first and second 
phases of Choice policy had similar reductions in the deleterious effect of competition on mortality 
for AMI (Ȗ1 = 0.0026**, Ȗ2 = 0.0024*). This was also the case for hip fracture, though the change 
was significant only during the second phase of Choice policy (Ȗ2  = 0.0029**).   For stroke, the only 
(weakly) significant effect of market structure on mortality is in the second phase of the Choice 
policy. Overall, having a choice of any qualified provider had similar effects to having a choice of at 
least four.  
 
Table 7.  Effect of market structure and introduction and extension of Choice on mortality 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.0015 0.0051** 0.0040 
 
(0.77) (2.39) (1.10) 
Rivals*Choice Introduction (?1 ) -0.0026** -0.0019 0.0004 
 
(-2.06) (-1.59) (0.22) 
Rivals*Choice Extension  (?2) -0.0024* -0.0029** 0.0019 
 
(-1.87) (-2.57) (1.00) 
Rivals post Choice Introduction ( ?0+?1) -0.0011 0.0032* 0.0043 
 (-0.64) (1.7) (1.37) 
Rivals post Choice Extension ( ?0+?2) -0.0009 0.0022 0.0059* 
 (-0.6) (1.34) (1.93) 
Rivals*Choice Extension  Rivals*Choice Intro (?2-?1) 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0015 
 (0.16) (-0.92) (1.11) 
    
F-stat  93.23  38.95  139.45 
Adjusted R^2 0.0405 0.0472 0.0888 
Patients 288287 91005 214103 
Sites 238 213 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Specification is model (16). 
Market structure: Equivalent N rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI). Choice Introduction: indicator for financial years 2006/7, 
2007/8; Choice Extension: indicator for financial years 2008/9 onwards. Years: 2002/3 to 20010/11.  All models contain 
year dummies, site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. Same number of observations, clusters as Table 3. t-
statistics in parentheses;   p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
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In Table 8 we report results from models for the period 2006/7 to 2009/10 in which we measure 
exposure to Choice as the proportions of patients reporting that they were offered a choice of 
provider or aware of their right to have a choice of provider.  These measures of choice vary both 
across providers and over time, compared to our other specifications which assume that the impact 
of Choice was immediate and the same for all providers.  Providers facing more rivals had lower AMI 
mortality and higher hip fracture and stroke mortality throughout the period, though the effect is 
statistically insignificant. The effect of market structure did not vary with either measure of the 
amount of choice for patients of different providers (Z1 is statistically insignificant in all cases).  
However, there does appear to be a direct impact of Choice: when a higher proportion of elective 
patients have been offered choice mortality for hip-fracture patients reduces (Z0 = 0.0348**).    
 
Table 8. Effect of market structure and proportion of patients reporting offered or aware of choice on 
mortality 2006/7-2009/10 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Choice measure:  Choice Awareness Offered Choice 
Rivals (G0) -0.0042 0.0016 0.0044 -0.0043 0.0026 0.0043 
 (-1.52) (0.44) (0.93) (-1.56) (0.77) (0.88) 
Choice (Z0) -0.0252 -0.0123 -0.0412 -0.0111 -0.0348** 0.0024 
 (-0.92) (-0.42) (-1.13) (-0.69) (-2.33) (0.09) 
Rivals*Choice (Z1) -0.0003 0.0021 0.0103 0.0050 0.0061 0.0124 
(-0.04) (0.29) (1.09) (0.56) (0.75) (0.90) 
       
F-stat 52.29 21.58 78.73 52.81 21.28 79.27 
Adjusted R^2 0.0340 0.0466 0.0848 0.0340 0.0468 0.0847 
Patients 117326 41132 90538 117326 41132 90538 
Sites 199 183 201 199 183 201 
Notes.  Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission.  Specification is model (17).  
Market structure: Equivalent N rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI). Choice proportions: proportions of patients reporting they 
were aware of their right be offered a choice of provider or were offered a choice. Interaction variable is product of 
demeaned market structure and demeaned choice proportion. All models contain year dummies, site fixed effects, patient 
and hospital covariates. t-statistics in parentheses; p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
 
5.1.5 Hospital characteristics 
The baseline model contains hospital characteristics as covariates. In Table 9 we report results from 
specified models where we also allow the effects of market structure to vary by whether the site 
belongs to a Foundation Trust, a Teaching Trust, or is in London. 
 
For sites which were not part of an FT, having more rivals increased mortality for hip fracture pre 
and post Choice and had positive but statistically insignificant effects for AMI and stroke.   FTs with 
more rivals had higher mortality pre and post Choice for stroke but market structure had no effect 
for FTs pre or post Choice for AMI and hip fracture.  
 
Pre Choice the detrimental effect of rivals was smaller and insignificant for sites in Teaching Trusts 
for hip fracture.  For stroke the deleterious effect of rivals was significant larger and significant for 
Teaching Trusts pre and post Choice.  
 
The effects of market structure do not vary with whether a site is in London.  
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Table 9.  Effect of market structure, Choice, and Trust type (Foundation Trust, Teaching Trust, London location) on mortality. 
Foundation Trusts sensitivity Teaching Trusts sensitivity London Sites sensitivity 
 
AMI 
Hip 
Fracture Stroke 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
ZŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? 0.0015 0.0048** 0.0040 ZŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? 0.0009 0.0062** -0.0002 ZŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? 0.0005 0.0047* 0.0028 
 
(0.78) (2.28) (1.12) 
 
(0.43) (2.45) (-0.05) 
 
(0.26) (1.86) (0.68) 
FT*Rivals pre Ch.  
 ?ɶ ? ? 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0059 
Teach*Rivals pre Ch.  
 ?ɶ ? ? 0.0021 -0.0035 0.0111** 
London*Rivals pre Ch.  
 ?ɶ ? ? 0.0050 0.0017 0.0006 
 
(1.17) (-0.57) (1.50) 
 
(0.69) (-1.41) (2.31) 
 
(0.90) (0.42) (0.10) 
Pol Bk* Rivals  ?ɶ ? ? -0.0037*** -0.0015 0.0006 WŽůŬ ?ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ? ? -0.0027** -0.0028** 0.0007 WŽůŬ ?ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ? ? -0.0021* -0.0027* 0.0031 
 
(-2.92) (-1.40) (0.31) 
 
(-2.26) (-2.49) (0.42) 
 
(-1.65) (-1.90) (1.46) 
WŽůŬ ?&d ?ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ? ? 0.0009 -0.0017 -0.0034 
Pol Bk*Teach*Rivals 
 ?ɶ ? ? 0.0003 0.0010 0.0008 
Pol Bk* London *Rivals 
 ?ɶ ? ? -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0026 
 
(0.57) (-1.03) (-1.21) 
 
(0.19) (0.87) (0.40) 
 
(-0.69) (0.18) (-1.39) 
Rivals post Ch. 
 ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? -0.0022 0.0033* 0.0046 
Rivals post Ch. 
 ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? -0.0017 0.0034* 0.0005 ZŝǀĂůƐƉŽƐƚŚ ? ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? -0.0016 0.002 0.0059 
 
(-1.42) (1.93) (1.48) 
 
(-1.04) (1.68) (0.14) 
 
(-1.04) (1.07) (1.82) 
FT & non-FT Rivals 
ƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? 0.004 0.0035 0.0099* 
Teach & non-Teach 
ZŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? 0.003 0.0027 0.0109** 
London  & non- London  
ZŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? 0.0056 0.0064* 0.0034 
 
(1.31) (1.15) (1.86) 
 
(0.94) (1.21) (2.25) 
 
(1.04) (1.76) (0.57) 
Pol Bk* FT & non-FT 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ?A?ɶ ? ? -0.0027 -0.0032* -0.0028 
Pol Bk* Teach & non-
dĞĂĐŚZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ?A?ɶ ? ? -0.0024 -0.0018 0.0015 
Pol Bk*  London  & non- 
London  Rivals (ɶ1+ɶ3) -0.0032** -0.0025** 0.0006 
 (-1.25) (-1.68) (-0.83) 
 
(-1.38) (-1.52) (0.71) 
 
(-2.1) (-2.36) (0.32) 
Rivals post Ch. 
 ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ?A?ɶ ?A?ɶ ? ? 0.0013 0.0003 0.0071* 
Rivals post Ch. 
 ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ?A?ɶ ?A?ɶ ? ? 0.0007 0.0009 0.0124*** 
Rivals post Ch. 
 ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ?A?ɶ ?A?ɶ ? ? 0.0024 0.0039 0.004 
 
(0.72) (0.16) (1.95) 
 
(0.28) (0.5) (3.39) 
 
(0.52) (1.28) (0.75) 
F-stat  91.6053  38.3960  138.0232 F-stat  90.5624  38.1756  138.1145 F-stat  91.1790  39.2904  137.5182 
Adjusted R^2 0.0406 0.0473 0.0888 Adjusted R^2 0.0405 0.0472 0.0888 Adjusted R^2 0.0405 0.0472 0.0888 
Patients 288287 91005 214103 Patients 288287 91005 214103 Patients 288287 91005 214103 
Sites 238 213 236 Sites 238 213 236 Sites 238 213 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Pol Bk: Policy break indicator for years 2006/7 onwards.  Market structure: Equivalent N rival sites 
= 1/(predicted HHI).  FT: site in Foundation Trust.  Teach: site in teaching hospital.  London: site in London.  Years: 2002/3 to 20010/11. All models contain year effects, site fixed effects, 
patient and hospital covariates (including Foundation Trust, Teaching status, London location). Same number observations, clusters as Table 4. t-statistics in parentheses. p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  
***p<0.01.
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5.1.6 Market structure measured at trust level 
It is of interest whether sites are motivated by competition they face or by the overall level 
competition faced by the Trust to which they belong.  In Table 10 we report results from the policy 
break model when market structure for a site as the average number of rivals of sites belonging to 
the same Trust. The results are very similar to those in Table 4 where market structure is the number 
of rival sites facing the site.  This may be because most Trusts (around 60%) have only one site for 
treatment of these emergency patients. Moreover, hospital sites within a Trust may be close 
together and thus face very similar market structures.  
 
Table 10. Effect of market structure measured at Trust level on mortality 
 
AMI AMI Hip Fracture Hip Fracture Stroke Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
ZŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? 0.0003 0.0004 0.0047** 0.0007** 0.0032 0.0001 
 
(0.12) (1.25) (2.11) (2.55) (0.94) (0.20) 
WŽůŬ 踀 ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ? ? -0.0019* -0.0003** -0.0024** -0.0003*** 0.0023 0.0001 
 
(-1.80) (-2.30) (-2.35) (-2.98) (1.33) (0.46) 
Rivals Post Choice 
 ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? -.0017 .0001 .0023 .0004** .0055* .0002 
 
(-.93) (.47) (1.33) (1.99) (1.9) (.38) 
       F-stat  107.6698  109.0394  41.9623  41.6690  214.3432  212.8411 
Adjusted R^2 0.0399 0.0399 0.0473 0.0473 0.0873 0.0873 
Patients 288287 288287 91005 91005 214103 214103 
Sites 165 165 160 160 163 163 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Market structure: mean of the 
site level measures for sites owned by the Trust. Hospital clusters and fixed effects at trust level.  Otherwise specification 
as for models in Table 3. t-statistics in parentheses;  p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
5.1.7 Competition from NHS and private providers 
The most salient change in the market structure for providers of care to NHS patients since 2002/3 
has been the entry of private sector providers, with 14 non-NHS sites providing elective care in 
2002/3 and 146 in 2010/11. Table 11 has results from the policy break specification but using 
separate measures of market structure from NHS and private (ISP) providers. The number of private 
rivals has no effect on mortality pre or post Choice for any of the conditions. 
 
5.2 Flexible specification 
The policy break specification forces the effects of market structure to be the same in all pre Choice 
years and in all post-Choice years: it estimates the effects of market structure as a step function of 
time.  If there is a trend in the effect of market structure, the policy break specification may 
therefore misleadingly suggest that Choice changed the effect of market structure.  The flexible 
specification allows the effect of market structure and all the covariates to vary for all years.
26
   
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 We also estimated specifications in which the effect of the covariates was forced to be constant over all nine years and 
obtained similar temporal patterns of estimated effects of market structure (see Appendix Table B3). 
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Table 11. Effect of competition from NHS and private rivals on 30 day hospital mortality 
 
AMI                      Hip Fracture Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 N rival sites N rival sites N rival sites 
E,^ƌŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? ? ? 0.0008 0.0013*** 0.0005 
 
(1.65) (3.39) (0.84) 
WƌŝǀĂƚĞƌŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? ? ? 0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0030 
 
(0.26) (-0.52) (-0.80) 
WŽůŬ 踀N,^ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ? ? ? ? -0.0003** -0.0003*** -0.0001 
 
(-2.19) (-3.14) (-0.51) 
WŽůŬ 踀PƌŝǀĂƚĞZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ? ? ? ? -0.0006 0.0014 0.0028 
 
(-0.23) (0.53) (0.74) 
NHS rivals ƉŽƐƚŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? ?A?ɶ ? ? ? ? 0.0005 0.001** 0.0004 
 
(1.14) (2.89) (0.81) 
WƌŝǀĂƚĞƌŝǀĂůƐƉŽƐƚŚ ? ?ɷ ? ? ?A?ɶ ? ? ? ? 0 0.0001 -0.0002 
 
(0.04) (0.14) (-0.17) 
        
F-stat  93.3143  38.6420  136.2846 
Adjusted R^2 0.0405 0.0473 0.0887 
Patients 288287 91005 214103 
Sites 238 213 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Same specification as Table 3 
models apart from competition measures. t-statistics in parentheses; p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Figure 4 showed that there were clear downward trends in unconditional (raw) mortality risk over 
the period.  The year effects estimated with the policy break specification also had a downward 
trend (see the full results in Appendix Table A1).  Figure 7 shows that the year effects estimated 
with the flexible model are almost never significant and do not exhibit any obvious trends.  Thus 
once we allow for time varying coefficients on the covariates there are no unexplained year effects, 
suggesting that the flexible model is doing a good job of capturing improvements in treatment over 
time via the changing effects of patient characteristics. Figure 7 also suggests that there was no 
obvious direct effect of the introduction of Choice in 2006 (corresponding to
eqT  in the theory model 
of section 2). 
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Figure 7.  Estimated year effects relative to 2005/6 after allowing for all explanatories 
Notes.  Plot of estimated year effects, relative to 2005/6, from the flexible specification with year effects, site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates and with the effects of covariates 
allowed to vary by year.  
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Table 12 ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ĞĂĐŚ ǇĞĂƌ  ?ɷ0 A? ɶt) and these are 
plotted in Figure 8. The changes over time in the effects estimated with the two market structure 
measures are fairly similar for a given condition, though the model with the simple count of rivals 
has more statistically significant coefficients for AMI and hip fracture.  For both AMI and hip fracture 
sites with more rivals initially have higher mortality. There is a downward trend in this detrimental 
effect of the rivals until around 2007/8 after which the effect of market structure is roughly 
constant. These results explain why the policy break specification suggested that the introduction of 
Choice in 2006/7 reduced the detrimental effect of having more rivals on AMI and hip fracture 
mortality: on average, the deleterious effect was larger before 2006/7 than afterwards.  But as 
Figure 8 shows, the reduction in the deleterious effect of rivals started before the introduction of 
Choice.
27, 28
 
 
Table 12. Year varying effects of market structure and covariates on mortality
 
  AMI AMI Hip Fracture Hip Fracture Stroke Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
Rivals 2002/3 (?0+?02) 0.0005** 0.0010** 0.0075** 0.0017*** -0.0040 -0.0006 
 
(0.2049) (2.0673) (2.0653) (3.2344) (-0.7773) (-0.7173) 
Rivals 2003/4 (?0+?03)  0.0019 0.0012** 0.0032 0.0018*** 0.0026 -0.0007 
 
(0.75) (2.3503) (1.1451) (3.2208) (0.5393) (-0.7805) 
Rivals 2004/5 (?0+?04)  0.0007 0.001** 0.0072*** 0.0019*** 0.0052 -0.0004 
 
(0.3337) (2.19) (2.6182) (3.7186) (1.2871) (-0.4434) 
Rivals 2005/6 (?0) 0.0009 0.0010** 0.0057** 0.0016*** 0.0035 -0.0004 
 
(0.44) (2.29) (2.27) (3.71) (0.92) (-0.53) 
Rivals 2006/7 (?0+?06)  0.0001 0.0008** .0034 0.0013*** 0.0024 -0.0006 
 (0.0333) (2.0278) (1.5266) (3.1208) (0.6716) (-0.8169) 
Rivals 2007/8 (?0+?07)   -0.0014  0.0007*  0.0039*  0.0013*** 0.0024  -0.0005 
 
(-0.7074) (1.6921) (1.9275) (3.0394) (0.6571) (-0.6707) 
Rivals 2008/9 (?0+?08)  -0.0012 0.0008** 0.0029 0.0013*** 0.0008 -0.0007 
 
(-0.642) (1.9729) (1.2364) (3.104) (0.2194) (-0.9286) 
Rivals 2009/10 (?0+?09)  -0.0015 .0008** 0.003 0.0012*** 0.0039 -0.0003 
 
(-0.7945) (2.0955) (1.5274) (2.9996) (1.07) (-0.4987) 
Rivals 2010/11 (?0+?10)  -0.0006 0.0007* 0.0039** 0.0012*** 0.0024 -0.0006 
 
(-0.3274) (1.9288) (2.0715) (3.3743) (0.7293) (-0.9447) 
      
Adjusted R^2 0.0422 0.0423 0.0487 0.0488 0.0915 0.0914 
Patients 288287 288287 91005 91005 214103 214103 
Sites 238 238 213 213 236 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Equivalent N rival sites = 
1/(predicted HHI).  Specification is model (18). Financial years: 2002/3 to 2010/11. All models contain year effects, site 
fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. All covariates are interacted with year indicators.  Same number 
observations, clusters as Table 3. t-statistics in parentheses;   p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01.  
                                                 
27
 We also estimated a specification, similar to that used by Cooper et al. (2011), in which the effect of market structure 
follows possibly different linear trends before and after Choice.  We find that there was no statistically significant change in 
the trend in the effect of having more rivals after the introduction of Choice in 2006 for AMI or hip fracture patients (see 
Appendix Tables B1, B2). We prefer our fully flexible specification as a means of examining whether the effect of market 
structure varied over time and whether any changes were associated with the introduction of Choice since it does not 
constrain changes over time to follow linear trends and the results are easier to interpret.  We discuss the reasons for the 
difference between our results and those in Cooper et al (2011). 
28
 We also estimated difference in difference specifications similar to those used by Gaynor et al (2013) and following them 
in using data for only two years 2002/3 and 2007/8.  Like Gaynor et al (2013) we find that providers exposed to more 
competition in 2003/4 have significantly lower 2007/8 AMI mortality. However, providers exposed to more competition in 
2003/4 had insignificantly higher hip fracture and stroke mortality in 2007/8 (see Appendix Table B3).  Use of these two 
years to identify an effect of Choice assumes that there is no underlying trend in the effect of market structure.  
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Figure 8. Trends in effect of number of rivals on mortality risk 
 
Notes. Estimated effects of number of rivals in each year from the flexible specification with year effects, site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates and with the effects of covariates 
allowed to vary by year.  
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The estimated effect of more rivals on stroke mortality risk is statistically insignificant in all years for 
both market structure measures.  Nor do the point estimates exhibit any trend. 
 
For AMI an increase in 1 standard deviation in the number of rivals increases the number of deaths 
by around 550 (95% CI: 30 to 1133) in 2002/3, with the effect declining to around 375 (95% CI: -6 to 
711) in 2010/11.  For hip fracture the increase in the number of deaths from a 1 standard deviation 
increase in the number of rivals was around 275 (95% CI: 103 to 420) in 2002/3 and did not change 
much over the period.   
 
5.3 Decomposition of change in mortality 
We use the results from our flexible specification to make a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the 
change in the average mortality probability between 2002/3 and 2010/11.  In Table 13 we 
decompose the change (A) into five parts: the change in the year effect (B) , the change in the mix of 
sites (C),
29
  the change in the effect of market structure (D), the change in average market structure 
(E), and the change in the covariates and in their effects (F). Both the magnitude of the change in 
mortality risk and the importance of the factors responsible for the changes vary considerably across 
the three conditions.  Changes in the mix of patients and in changes in the effect of patient 
characteristics (F) make the largest contribution to the reduction in mortality risk.   The change in 
year effect makes a small and insignificant contribution (B) for AMI and for stroke.  This is as 
expected given the lack of statistical significance for year effects with the flexible specification (see 
Figure 7).   Figure 7 also suggests that the positive, large, and significant contribution of the 
difference in year effects for hip fracture is due to the particular pair of years considered.   
 
The distribution of patients across sites with different time invariant effects makes small but 
statistically significant contribution (C) for all three conditions. For AMI and stroke patients seem to 
have shifted to sites with lower inherent mortality risk whereas for hip fracture the reverse is true. 
 
Column D reports the contribution of the change in the effect of the number of rivals (J10  J2) 
applied to the average number of rivals in 2010/11 ( 10M ).  For AMI the reduction in the deleterious 
effect of rivals reduces mortality but the contribution is small and not statistically significant.  For hip 
fracture the reduction in the deleterious effect of rivals is greater and as the overall reduction in hip 
fracture mortality is smaller, it accounts for a greater proportion than for AMI.  The change in the 
average market structure (column E) has a statistically insignificant contribution for AMI and hip 
fracture.  For all three conditions the absolute size of the contribution of the change in the effect of 
the number of rivals is much greater than the change in the number of rivals. 
                                                 
29
 Site fixed effects are constant over the period but the set of providers and their share of patients changed, so this term is 
the change in mortality risk due to the change in the weighted average of the site fixed effects.  See Appendix C for details 
of the decomposition.  
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Table 13. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the change in mortality risk  
AMI - Mortality decomposition 2002/3 vs 2010/11 
  A B C D E F 
Mortality change -0.0265 
     
Contribution to mort. change 
 
0.0077 -0.0021 -0.0037 0.0004 -0.0289 
Lower Bound 
 
-0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0075 -0.0044 
 
Upper Bound 
 
0.0163 -0.0018 0.0002 0.0053 
 
% age Contribution to mort. 
change  
29.06% -7.88% -13.87% 1.55% -108.86% 
Lower Bound 
 
-3.21% -8.83% -28.30% -16.67%  
Upper Bound 
 
61.37% -6.95% 0.56% 19.79%  
       
Hip Fracture -  Mortality decomposition 2002/3 vs 2010/11  
  A B C D E F 
Mortality change -0.0109 
     
Contribution to mort. change 
 
0.0113 0.0008 -0.0115 0.0055 -0.0169 
Lower Bound 
 
0.0028 0.0004 -0.0167 -0.0017 
 
Upper Bound 
 
0.0198 0.0012 -0.0063 0.0126 
 
% age Contribution to mort. 
change  
103.86% 6.98% -105.60% 50.23% -155.46% 
Lower Bound 
 
25.90% 3.23% -154.00% -15.13%  
Upper Bound 
 
182.00% 10.76% -57.57% 115.00%  
       Stroke -  Mortality decomposition 2002/3 vs 2010/11 
  A B C D E F 
Mortality change -0.0501 
     
Contribution to mort. change 
 
-0.0080 -0.0013 0.0212 -0.0031 -0.0590 
Lower Bound 
 
-0.0210 -0.0018 0.0141 -0.0132 
 
Upper Bound 
 
0.0050 -0.0007 0.0283 0.0070 
 
% age Contribution to mort. change 
 
-15.98% -2.49% 42.31% -6.22% -117.61% 
Lower Bound 
 
-41.96% -3.54% 28.17% -26.33%  
Upper Bound 
 
9.99% -1.46% 56.47% 13.89%  
Notes. A = mortality change; B = difference in year effects; C = difference in site distribution of patients; D = 
change in effect of Mkt Structure times Mkt Structure in year 2010; E = effect of Mkt Structure in year 2002 
times change in Mkt Structure (2010/112002/3); F = change in covariates plus change in effect of covariates.  
Derived from flexible specification (18) with year varying effects for all covariates.  Market structure measure: 
predicted equivalent number of rival sites (1/pHHI) within 30km.  Lower and upper bounds are 95% confidence 
intervals.  See Appendix C for details on the decomposition.   
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6 Conclusions  
Results from the policy break model, in which the effect of market structure was constrained to be 
the same in all pre-Choice and in all post-Choice years, suggest that in the pre-Choice period 
providers facing more rivals (more competition) had higher AMI and hip fracture mortality. In the 
post-Choice period, the detrimental effect of rivals was smaller and statistically significant only for 
hip fracture. Market structure never appears to have any effect on stroke mortality. 
 
The policy break model suggests that introduction of Choice could have reduced the detrimental 
effect of having more rivals for AMI and hip fracture.   We do not find evidence that the detrimental 
effect of rivals was further reduced when Choice was extended in 2008. Neither we find that the 
effect of market structure varied with the proportion of patients who reported being aware of their 
right to a choice or being offered a choice. Thus we did not find any evidence that expanding Choice 
further changed the effect of market structure.  
 
Our flexible model in which the effect of market structure was allowed to vary across all years 
suggested that the effect at the start of the period in 2002/3 of having more rivals was to increase 
mortality for AMI and hip fracture and that this detrimental effect became smaller over time.  
However, the decline in the detrimental effect of more rivals started before the introduction of 
Choice, suggesting that it was not due Choice policy.  We speculate that the reduction in the 
detrimental effect of rivals may have been due to changes in medical knowledge and to the roll out 
of Payment by Results which increased the proportion of site income that varied with the number of 
patients.  We plan to investigate this further in future work.   
 
Even if Choice does not systematically change the effect of market structure on mortality, this does 
not mean that the introduction of Choice did not benefit patients.  Patients may place an intrinsic 
value on having a choice of provider. Even if Choice did not change the quality of providers, patients 
could gain from being able to switch to providers they preferred, either because they had higher 
quality, or for other reasons such as lower waiting times (Gaynor et al, 2012b). 
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Appendix A. Policy break model  
 
A1. Baseline model: full results 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
2002 0.0166*** 0.0171*** 0.0063** 0.0063** 0.0123*** 0.0110*** 
 
(7.12) (7.54) (2.30) (2.35) (2.92) (2.64) 
2003 0.0121*** 0.0132*** 0.0017 0.0030 0.0115*** 0.0109** 
 
(5.59) (5.85) (0.66) (1.13) (2.88) (2.58) 
2004 0.0060*** 0.0067*** -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0027 0.0025 
 
(3.07) (3.34) (-0.42) (-0.13) (0.82) (0.71) 
2006 0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0027 -0.0054* -0.0120** -0.0078* 
 
(0.57) (-0.51) (-0.65) (-1.71) (-2.28) (-1.90) 
2007 -0.0034 -0.0067*** -0.0042 -0.0070** -0.0076 -0.0032 
 
(-0.98) (-2.70) (-1.03) (-2.28) (-1.36) (-0.71) 
2008 -0.0069* -0.0106*** -0.0094** -0.0121*** -0.0196*** -0.0141*** 
 
(-1.94) (-3.91) (-2.27) (-3.89) (-3.55) (-3.18) 
2009 -0.0144*** -0.0185*** -0.0129*** -0.0160*** -0.0205*** -0.0147*** 
 
(-4.00) (-6.53) (-3.05) (-4.95) (-3.55) (-3.28) 
2010 -0.0161*** -0.0212*** -0.0247*** -0.0290*** -0.0118** -0.0056 
 
(-4.02) (-6.33) (-6.16) (-9.44) (-2.07) (-1.34) 
Rivals pre Choice 
 ?ɷ ? ? 0.0016 0.0007* 0.0048** 0.0010*** 0.0044 0.0002 
 
(0.80) (1.78) (2.29) (3.24) (1.22) (0.46) 
Pol Brk * Rivals 
 ?ɶ ? ? -0.0025** -0.0003** -0.0025** -0.0003*** 0.0012 -0.0000 
 
(-2.21) (-2.43) (-2.39) (-3.25) (0.73) (-0.32) 
Rivals post 
ŚŽŝĐĞ ?ɷ ?нɶ ? ? -0.001 0.0004 0.0024 0.0007*** 0.0056* 0.0002 
 
(-0.65) (1.18) (1.43) (2.75) (1.85) (0.43) 
IMD Income 
2002/10 -0.0028 -0.0026 0.0373*** 0.0377*** 0.0187 0.0183 
 
(-0.34) (-0.32) (3.26) (3.30) (1.56) (1.53) 
IMD Living 
Environment 
2002/10 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
 
(2.06) (2.16) (-0.97) (-0.92) (0.80) (0.73) 
Incapacity Claims 
% 0.0724 0.0700 -0.0197 -0.0230 0.0741 0.0768 
 
(1.26) (1.22) (-0.28) (-0.33) (0.83) (0.86) 
Disability Claims 
% 0.0704 0.0713 -0.0233 -0.0220 0.0943 0.0938 
 
(1.58) (1.61) (-0.40) (-0.38) (1.32) (1.31) 
Female patient 0.0119*** 0.0119*** -0.0107*** -0.0107*** 0.0156*** 0.0156*** 
 
(10.02) (10.03) (-7.87) (-7.85) (9.46) (9.46) 
Patient's Age 0.0034*** 0.0034*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 
 
(2.65) (2.64) (5.85) (5.85) (15.69) (15.69) 
Number of 
diagnosis 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0078*** 0.0078*** -0.0144*** -0.0144*** 
 
(3.68) (3.67) (19.28) (19.23) (-20.09) (-20.04) 
38  CHE Research Paper 106 
 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Charlson Index - 
Medium 
Comorbidities 0.0244*** 0.0244*** 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0284*** 0.0283*** 
 
(17.42) (17.40) (7.08) (7.07) (13.43) (13.42) 
Charlson Index - 
High 
Comorbidities 0.0852*** 0.0852*** 0.0557*** 0.0557*** 0.0771*** 0.0770*** 
 
(32.94) (32.92) (18.95) (18.95) (21.95) (21.92) 
Teaching Trust 0.0077* 0.0067 0.0093*** 0.0082*** 0.0106 0.0093 
 
(1.69) (1.61) (3.92) (2.89) (0.79) (0.63) 
Foundation Trust -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0005 0.0024 0.0013 
 
(-0.19) (-0.13) (0.30) (0.22) (0.60) (0.32) 
Distance to 
provider 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0001** -0.0001** 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (-4.09) (-4.09) (-2.41) (-2.42) 
Age band 35 to 
44 years -0.0277*** -0.0276*** -0.0062** -0.0061** -0.0127*** -0.0127*** 
 
(-14.90) (-14.88) (-2.09) (-2.07) (-3.17) (-3.17) 
Age band 45 to 
54 years -0.0457*** -0.0456*** -0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0298*** -0.0298*** 
 
(-14.21) (-14.19) (-3.34) (-3.34) (-4.95) (-4.95) 
Age band 55 to 
64 years -0.0419*** -0.0418*** -0.0182*** -0.0182*** -0.0275*** -0.0275*** 
 
(-8.99) (-8.97) (-2.87) (-2.87) (-3.31) (-3.31) 
Admitted from 
home -0.0159*** -0.0158*** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0035 -0.0037 
 
(-3.66) (-3.63) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.35) (-0.37) 
Admitted from 
temporary 
location -0.0155** -0.0155** -0.0062 -0.0061 0.0098 0.0097 
 
(-2.12) (-2.11) (-1.05) (-1.03) (0.57) (0.57) 
DOA = Sunday  0.0017 0.0017 0.0013 0.0014 0.0194*** 0.0193*** 
 
(0.90) (0.90) (0.63) (0.65) (6.77) (6.77) 
DOA = Tuesday -0.0027* -0.0027* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0029 0.0029 
 
(-1.69) (-1.70) (0.12) (0.13) (1.12) (1.13) 
DOA = 
Wednesday -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0015 -0.0014 0.0053** 0.0053** 
 
(-1.46) (-1.46) (-0.72) (-0.70) (2.08) (2.07) 
DOA = Thursday -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0006 0.0006 
 
(-0.58) (-0.59) (-1.22) (-1.22) (0.23) (0.23) 
DOA = Friday -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0032 -0.0032 
 
(-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.96) (-0.95) (-1.35) (-1.35) 
DOA = Saturday -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0026 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 
 
(-0.67) (-0.67) (-1.34) (-1.34) (4.46) (4.46) 
MOA = February -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(-0.79) (-0.79) (-0.23) (-0.24) (0.04) (0.03) 
MOA = March -0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0105*** -0.0105*** 
 
(-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.79) (-0.81) (-2.99) (-3.00) 
MOA = April 0.0036* 0.0035* -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0014 
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AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
 
(1.70) (1.69) (-0.40) (-0.43) (-0.40) (-0.40) 
MOA = May -0.0034 -0.0034 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0097*** -0.0097*** 
 
(-1.59) (-1.59) (0.31) (0.30) (-2.66) (-2.67) 
MOA = June 0.0001 0.0001 0.0027 0.0027 -0.0061* -0.0061* 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.96) (0.96) (-1.75) (-1.75) 
MOA = July 0.0009 0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0076** -0.0076** 
 
(0.39) (0.39) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-2.10) (-2.11) 
MOA = August -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0143*** -0.0143*** 
 
(-0.08) (-0.09) (-0.23) (-0.25) (-3.77) (-3.77) 
MOA = 
September -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0021 -0.0082** -0.0082** 
 
(-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.79) (-0.82) (-2.23) (-2.22) 
MOA = October -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0033 -0.0033 
 
(-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.91) (-0.91) 
MOA = 
November -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0026 0.0026 
 
(-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.12) (-0.13) (0.66) (0.65) 
MOA = December 0.0051** 0.0051** 0.0010 0.0010 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 
 
(2.25) (2.24) (0.43) (0.41) (2.85) (2.85) 
Hip Fracture: 
Pertrochanteric 
  
-0.0014 -0.0014 
  
   
(-0.96) (-0.99) 
  Hip Fracture: 
Subtrochanteric 
  
-0.0010 -0.0009 
  
   
(-0.32) (-0.32) 
  Stroke: 
Haemorragic 
    
0.1842*** 0.1843*** 
     
(41.75) (41.78) 
Stroke: Infarction 
    
-0.0456*** -0.0456*** 
     
(-11.83) (-11.81) 
Stroke: Occlusion 
    
-0.0327*** -0.0327*** 
     
(-2.71) (-2.70) 
Stroke: Other 
    
-0.0989*** -0.0987*** 
     
(-19.64) (-19.62) 
Constant -0.1348*** -0.1385*** -0.0805*** -0.0800*** -0.0839*** -0.0740*** 
 
(-13.46) (-14.68) (-6.67) (-7.29) (-4.51) (-4.19) 
      
F-stat 93.74 95.14 39.80 40.05 141.73 141.56 
Adjusted R^2 0.0405 0.0405 0.0472 0.0473 0.0888 0.0887 
R^2 0.0415 0.0415 0.0499 0.0500 0.0900 0.0899 
Patients 288287 288287 91005 91005 214103 214103 
Sites 238 238 213 213 236 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission.  Market structure measured at 
site level. Financial years (e.g. 2008 is April 2008 to March 2009). PolBk: indicator for 2006/7 onwards.  All models include 
site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. DOA = day of admission; MOA = month of admission;  t-statistics in 
parentheses;   * p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01 
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A2. Logistic model of patient mortality 
 
AMI AMI Hip Fracture Hip Fracture Stroke Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent N 
rival sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Equivale
nt N rival 
sites 
30km 
N Rival sites 
30km 
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.0204 0.0118** 0.1536** 0.0305*** 0.0342 0.0002 
 
(0.60) (1.96) (2.06) (3.00) (1.19) (0.04) 
PolBk*Rivals (J1)  -0.0310 -0.0046** -0.0668* -0.0103*** 0.0049 -0.0006 
 
(-1.61 (-2.15) (-1.91) (-3.17) (0.36) (-0.55) 
Rivals post Choice (G0+J1)  -0.0106 0.0074 0.0868 0.02020** 0.03918 -0.00049 
 
(-0.40) (1.44) (1.40) (2.34) (1.62) (-0.14) 
Pseudo R^2 0.0846 0.0847 0.1615 0.1617 0.1001 0.1001 
Patients 288287 288287 90527 90527 214103 214103 
Sites 238 238 204 204 236 236 
Average Marginal Effects of Market Structure 
Rivals pre Choice (G0) 0.00117 0.000674 0.00458 0.000890** 0.00417 0.0000188 
 
(0.60) (1.94) (1.94) (2.87) (1.18) (0.04) 
ZŝǀĂůƐƉŽƐƚŚŽŝĐĞ ?ɷ0A㴂?1) -0.000567 0.000397 0.00221 0.000525* 0.00481 -0.0000599 
 
(-0.40) (1.44) (1.41) (2.36) (1.62) (-0.14) 
Notes. Policy break specification (15) run with unconditional logit fixed-effects. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 
died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Equivalent N rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI at 30 km). All models include site 
fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. t-statistics in parentheses;     *p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix B. Additional specifications 
In this appendix we report results from specifications similar to those in Cooper et al (2011) and 
Gaynor et al (2013) but using our data set and market structure measures. 
 
B1. Cooper et al (2011) replication 
 
Tables B1 and B2 have the results from a specification similar to the preferred specification in 
Cooper et al (2011), in which year effects and the effects of market structure are constrained to 
follow possibly different linear trends pre and post Choice:  
 
   
1 11 2 ( 2006/7) 0 1 2 ( 2006/7) 1 1 2 2iht t Q ht ht ht t Q h iht ht ihtq t t M M t M t X XE E D D D P M M Ht t        1 1     (B1) 
 
where now t is a running count of quarters from t = 1 (first quarter 2002/03) to t = 36 (fourth quarter 
2010/11).   t = 17 (first quarter 2006/07) is the first post Choice quarter. The market structure 
variables and hospital covariates are measured for years, rather than quarters. The marginal effect 
of market structure in a pre-Choice period t is 0 1tD D  and in a post Choice period it is 
 0 1 2 tD D D  . Thus the key parameter for testing whether there is a different trend post Choice 
is 2D .   
 
In none of the models (with different periods and different patient age ranges) for AMI or hip 
fracture is there a statistically significant change in the trend in the effect of market structure after 
the introduction of Choice in April 2006.  There is a greater negative trend in the effect of market 
structure after Choice for stroke when the model is estimated over the same 2002/3 to 2008/9 
period as Cooper et al (2011) but the change in trend is smaller and significant only at 10% for our 
longer period and for our set of patients aged 35-74). With the Cooper et al (2011) age range of 39 
to 100 the negative trend is insignificant for our time period.  
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Table B1. Effect of market structure and Choice on mortality aged 35-74: Cooper et al (2011) time trend 
specification 
  Patients: age 35-74 
 Period: 2002/3-2008/9 Period: 2002/3-2010/11 
 AMI Hip 
Fracture 
Stroke AMI Hip 
Fracture 
Stroke 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dƌĞŶĚ ?ɴ ? ? 0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0030** 0.0017* -0.0003 -0.0017 
 (0.87) (-1.11) (-2.43) (1.81) (-0.33) (-1.36) 
Change in trend 
ƉŽƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ɴ ? ? -0.0028* 0.0033** 0.0037* -0.0031*** 0.0014 0.0017 
 (-1.67) (2.08) (1.67) (-2.77) (1.33) (0.93) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɲ ? ? 0.0019 0.0037 -0.0067 0.0032 0.0053* -0.0024 
 (0.54) (1.02) (-1.15) (0.99) (1.68) (-0.44) 
dƌĞŶĚ 踀 ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɲ ? ? -0.0003** -0.0001 0.0007*** -0.0003** -0.0002 0.0005** 
 (-2.06) (-0.55) (3.05) (-2.18) (-1.30) (2.43) 
Change in trend 
post 2006 * Rivals 
 ?ɲ ? ? 
0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0013** 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0006* 
 (0.85) (-0.64) (-2.50) (1.54) (0.53) (-1.92) 
       
F-stat 66.91 26.93 95.94 74.69 40.94 120.94 
Adjusted R^2 0.0485 0.0496 0.0907 0.0454 0.0477 0.0889 
Patients 235385 68918 166672 287437 90734 213733 
Sites 229 204 227 238 213 236 
Notes: Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Market Structure: Equivalent N 
rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI at 30 km). Time: quarters.  Specification (B1).  All models contain year*Government Office 
Region interactions, site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. t-statistics in parentheses;  * p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** 
p<0.01.   
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Table B2. Effect of market structure and Choice on mortality aged 39-100: Cooper et al (2011) time trend 
specification 
  Patients: age 39-100 
 Period: 2002/3-2008/9 Period: 2002/3-2010/11 
 AMI Hip 
Fracture 
Stroke AMI Hip 
Fracture 
Stroke 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
dƌĞŶĚ ?ɴ ? ? 0.0008 0.0012* -0.0037*** 0.0012 0.0017** -0.0020* 
 
(0.84) (1.70) (-3.47) (1.30) (2.52) (-1.96) 
Change in trend 
ƉŽƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ɴ ? ? -0.0025 0.0025* 0.0040** -0.0021* 0.0018** 0.0018 
 
(-1.56) (1.84) (2.09) (-1.96) (2.07) (1.23) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɲ ? ? 0.0005 0.0056 -0.0038 0.0017 0.0085** -0.0018 
 
(0.13) (1.65) (-0.59) (0.47) (2.55) (-0.32) 
dƌĞŶĚ 踀 ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɲ ? ? -0.0002 -0.0003** 0.0007** -0.0002 -0.0003** 0.0005** 
 
(-1.23) (-2.06) (2.52) (-1.29) (-2.44) (2.08) 
Change in trend 
post 2006 * Rivals 
 ?ɲ ? ? 
0.0002 0.0002 -0.0013** 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0004 
 
(0.49) (0.51) (-2.18) (1.00) (1.23) (-1.07) 
       
F-stat 200.62 133.49 308.47 252.21 166.02 402.90 
Adjusted R^2 0.0816 0.0733 0.1169 0.0788 0.0705 0.1126 
Patients 428120 347992 425468 525976 455176 544991 
Sites 229 205 227 238 214 236 
Notes: Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Market Structure: Equivalent N 
rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI at 30 km). Time: quarters.  Specification (B1).  All models contain year*Government Office 
Region interactions, site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. t-statistics in parentheses;  * p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** 
p<0.01 
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B2. Gaynor et al (2013) replication 
  
Gaynor et al (2013) use only two periods of data (2003/4 and 2007/8) to avoid possible confounding 
the effect of Choice with other policy changes and estimate a form of difference in differences (DID) 
specification.  Their unit of analysis is the hospital trust and they measure quality as mortality rate 
for the Trust, and Trust level casemix variables.  In terms of our individual level data their 
specification is :  
 
 0 1 ( 2007/8) 2003 ( 2007/8) 1 1 2 2iht h t h t iht ht ihtq M X XE P E D M M H        1 1   (B2) 
 
In this case J1 is change in the effect of 2003 market structure between 2003 and 2007 rather than 
the change in the effect of period t market structure between t = 2003/4 and t = 2007/8.  
 
Table B3 (columns 1 to 3) reports results from this DID specification.  In all cases mortality is lower in 
the 2007/8 ( 1ÖE  < 0).  For AMI (column 1) our results are line in with Gaynor et (2013): in 2007/8 
providers exposed to more competition in 2003/4 have a lower AMI mortality (D < 0). However for 
hip fracture and stroke being exposed to more competition in 2002/3 increases hip fracture and 
stroke mortality, though D is insignificant.  
 
Columns 4 to 6 report results from the conventional DID formulation 
 
 0 1 ( 2007/8) 0 1 ( 2007/8) 1 1 2 2iht h t ht ht t iht ht ihtq M M X XE P E G J M M H         1 1   (B3) 
 
Column 4 shows that having more rivals increases mortality before Choice for AMI (though the effect 
is significant only at 10%) and has no effect for hip fracture and stroke. Post Choice in 2007/8 market 
structure has no significant effect for any of the conditions. For AMI, the deleterious effect of more 
competitive market structure is significantly smaller in the post Choice period.
 
For hip fracture and 
stroke it is insignificantly larger post Choice.  The results for AMI are qualitatively similar to Gaynor 
et al (2013)
 30
  and compatible with there being a secular reduction in the effect of rivals over this 
period which is not caused by the introduction of Choice, as suggested by the results from our 
flexible specification. 
  
                                                 
30
 Results from the conventional DID specification are reported in an earlier version (Gaynor et al, 2011; Appendix Table A4, 
model (3)). There is an insignificant negative estimated effect of HHI in 2002/3 on 2002/3 AMI mortality of 0.622 (SE: 
0.773) and a significant DID coefficient of 0.301 (SE: 0.117), so that the estimated effect of 2007/8 HHI on 2007/8 AMI 
mortality is 0.321, though the standard error in the latter is not reported so it is not possible to tell if it is significant. 
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Table B3. Market structure and Choice: difference in difference specification (Gaynor et al (2013)) 
  AMI Hip Fracture Stroke AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2007 (E1) -0.0170*** -0.0156** -0.0167* -0.0160*** -0.0156** -0.0168* 
 (-2.91) (-2.54) (-1.65) (-2.77) (-2.53) (-1.67) 
2007*Rivals 2003 (D) -0.0058** 0.0013 0.0029    
 (-2.28) (0.60) (0.86)    
ZŝǀĂůƐƉƌĞŚŽŝĐĞ ?ɷ ? ?    0.0133* -0.0020 -0.0068 
    (1.94) (-0.30) (-0.63) 
 ? ? ? ? ?ZŝǀĂůƐ ?ɶ ? ?    -0.0067** 0.0014 0.0033 
    (-2.54) (0.58) (0.91) 
Rivals post Choice 
 ?ɷ ?A?ɶ ? ? 
   0.0066 -0.0007 -0.0034 
    (1.18) (-0.12) (-0.39) 
       
F-stat 41.77 11.52 68.60 42.19 11.42 68.17 
Adjusted R^2 0.0481 0.0468 0.0916 0.0479 0.0471 0.0923 
Patients 65384 18968 45744 67856 19668 47664 
Sites 192 176 197 205 187 211 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission.  Market structure: Equivalent 
N rival sites = 1/(predicted HHI at 30 km). Specification (B2) for columns (1) to (3); specification (B3) for columns (4) to (6). 
All models include site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates. t-statistics in parentheses;  * p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** 
p<0.01. 
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B3. Semi-flexible specification 
  
Table B4 reports the effects of market structure from the semi-flexible specification in which the 
effects of covariates are constrained to be the same in all years: 
 
       0 ( ) 02005/6 2005/6iht t t t ht t ht t tt tq M ME E G Jc c c c cz z   ¦ ¦1 1 1 1 2 2iht ht h ihtX XM M P H       (B4) 
 
Table B4 Year varying effects of market structure on mortality from semi flexible model 
 
AMI Hip Fracture Stroke 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Equivalent 
N rival 
sites 
30km 
N. Rival sites 
30km 
Equivalent 
N rival sites 
30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
Equivalent N rival 
sites 30km 
N. Rival 
sites 30km 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?02) 0.0011 0.0008* 0.0071** 0.0014*** -0.0034 -0.0001 
 
(0.5) (1.87) (2.14) (2.72) (-0.68) (-0.16) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?03)  0.003 0.0011** 0.0027 0.0015*** 0.0015 -0.0003 
 
(1.18) (2.18) (1.07) (2.73) (0.31) (-0.32) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?04)  0.0021 0.0009** 0.0063** 0.0015*** 0.0049 0 
 
(0.98) (2.07) (2.47) (3.08) (1.21) (0.06) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0) 0.0007 0.0008** 0.0050** 0.0013*** 0.0037 0.0000 
 
(0.35) (2.09) (2.17) (3.10) (0.99) (0.03) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?06)  -0.0004 0.0006 0.0029 0.0011*** 0.0028 -0.0002 
 (-0.23) (1.57) (1.34) (2.64) (0.8) (-0.3) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?07)  -0.0016 0.0005 0.0036* 0.0011*** 0.0027 -0.0001 
 
(-0.8) (1.29) (1.89) (2.64) (0.71) (-0.11) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?08)  -0.0008 0.0006* 0.0018 0.0011** 0.0039 -0.0001 
 (-0.48) (1.67) (0.84) (2.54) (1.06) (-0.12) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?09)  -0.0014 0.0006* 0.0023 0.001** 0.0059* 0.0002 
 
(-0.78) (1.71) (1.22) (2.43) (1.66) (0.28) 
ZŝǀĂůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ɷ0A㴂?10)  -0.0002 0.0005 0.0028 0.0009*** 0.0033 -0.0001 
 
(-0.11) (1.56) (1.58) (2.75) (0.99) (-0.19) 
       F-stat 82.87 85.71 35.01 35.48 129.11 131.82 
Adjusted R^2 0.0405 0.0405 0.0472 0.0472 0.0888 0.0888 
Patients 288287 288287 91005 91005 214103 214103 
Sites 238 238 213 213 236 236 
Notes. Dependent variable: patient aged 35-74 died in hospital within 30 days of admission. Equivalent N rival sites = 
1/(predicted HHI).  Years are financial years e.g. 2008 is April 2008 to March 2009. Years: 2002/3 to 20010/11. All models 
contain year effects, site fixed effects, patient and hospital covariates.  Patient and hospital covariate effects are the same 
in all periods.  Same number observations, clusters as Table 4. t-statistics in parentheses;  * p<0.1,
 
** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01. 
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Appendix C. Decomposition of change in mortality risk 
 
In the text we use the fully flexible model for the decomposition of the change in average mortality 
probability between 2002/3 and 20010/11.  In the estimated linear probability model the residuals 
sum to zero, so that the average mortality probability in year t (not the baseline year t = 0 = 2005/6) 
is  
 ^ `0 01 11 Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Öt htH Nt t t ht t iht hh i
t
q M X
N
E E G J M Pt       ¦ ¦  
      =  0 0Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Öt t t t t tM XE E G J M P           (C1) 
 
where we have collapsed the vectors of patient and site covariates X1iht, X2ht into a single vector and 
 
 
2 1 2
1Ö Ö Öt t th ht h
t
N N N ht
t h hh i h
t t
N
N N
P P Pt  t
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹¦ ¦ ¦       (C2) 
 
is the average difference between the fixed effect of hospital h and the baseline hospital 1. 
 
Hence the decomposition of the change in average mortality probability between year 2002/3 and 
2010/11 is  
 
     10 2 0 10 0 10 10 10 10 10Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Öq q M XE E G J M P        
                                  0 2 2 0 2 2 2 2Ö Ö Ö Ö ÖÖ M XE P E G J Mª º    ¬ ¼     (C3) 
or  
   q10  q02 A: change in average mortality risk 
         10 02
Ö ÖE E   B: change in year effects 
              10 2Ö ÖP P   C:  change in average site effects 
                +  10 02 10Ö Ö MJ J  D: change in effect of market structure 
                  +   0 02 10 02Ö Ö M MG J   E: change in average market structure 
                    +    10 2 10 2 10 02Ö Ö ÖX X XM M M    F: change in effect of covariates and change in mean covariates 
 
The decomposition is reported in Table 13.   
48  CHE Research Paper 106 
 
Appendix D. Patient choice model results 
 
Table D1 reports the results from the year specific Poisson models of patient choice of elective 
provider with the number of patients from LSOA j choosing provider h in year t having conditional 
mean 
 
   ^ `2 21 2 1 2| , , exp X Xjht j jh ht jt t jh t jh ht t jh ht t jh ht tn d X d d X d X d X[ [ O O O O O(         (D1)
  
 
where djh is the distance from the centroid of LSOA j to hospital site h and Xht is a vector of dummies 
for hospital characteristics (NHS or private, belonging to a Foundation Trust, belonging to a teaching 
Trust). 
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Table D1.  Poisson models of patient choice of elective provider 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
coef coef coef coef coef coef coef coef coef 
Distance -0.2218*** -0.2221*** -0.2213*** -0.2187*** -0.1986*** -0.1988*** -0.1656*** -0.1686*** -0.1642*** 
Distance^2 0.0026*** 0.0028*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 
Private Hospital -4.3093*** -4.9789*** -4.3093*** -3.6677*** -3.1165*** -3.0299*** -2.5119*** -2.1926*** -2.0811*** 
Teaching Trust 0.2960*** 0.1450*** -0.0055 -0.0971*** -0.1062*** -0.0641*** 0.1288*** 0.0069 -0.0743*** 
Specialist Hospital -1.8382*** -1.9368*** -1.9708*** -1.9506*** -2.1845*** -2.2383*** -2.0953*** -2.1830*** -2.2349*** 
Multiservice Hospital 0.2706*** 0.2596*** 0.2979*** 0.0198* 0.2331*** 0.1581*** 0.1302*** -0.0876*** -0.1708*** 
Site in London 0.3378*** 0.3198*** 0.2631*** 0.1836*** 0.2848*** 0.3952*** 0.5465*** 0.6193*** 0.6997*** 
Private Hospital * Distance 0.2036*** 0.3126*** 0.1261*** 0.0415*** 0.0776*** 0.0694*** 0.0331*** 0.0400*** 0.0278*** 
Teaching Trust * Distance -0.0658*** -0.0610*** -0.0266*** -0.0141*** -0.0118*** -0.0264*** -0.0315*** -0.0225*** -0.0189*** 
Specialist Hospital * Distance 0.0799*** 0.0944*** 0.1050*** 0.0928*** 0.1139*** 0.1040*** 0.1010*** 0.1017*** 0.1057*** 
Multiservice Hospital * Distance -0.0815*** -0.0717*** -0.0592*** -0.0296*** -0.0779*** -0.0724*** -0.0901*** -0.0667*** -0.0709*** 
Site in London * Distance -0.1156*** -0.1110*** -0.1264*** -0.1350*** -0.1456*** -0.1494*** -0.1939*** -0.1972*** -0.1990*** 
Private Hospital * Distance^2 -0.0059 -0.0079*** -0.0015*** 0.0004** -0.0003** -0.0001 0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0001 
Teaching Trust * Distance^2 0.0025*** 0.0024*** 0.0016*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0018*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 
Specialist Hospital * Distance^2 -0.0008*** -0.0013*** -0.0016*** -0.0010*** -0.0015*** -0.0013*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 
Multiservice Hospital * Distance^2 0.0032*** 0.0022*** 0.0031*** 0.0025*** 0.0039*** 0.0035*** 0.0039*** 0.0032*** 0.0035*** 
Site in London * Distance^2 0.0036*** 0.0034*** 0.0039*** 0.0041*** 0.0046*** 0.0046*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0059*** 
Foundation Trust   -0.1177*** 0.1303*** 0.5184*** 0.2881*** 0.4379*** 0.3984*** 0.4569*** 
Foundation Trust * Distance   0.0145*** -0.0192*** -0.0696*** -0.0395*** -0.0785*** -0.0606*** -0.0562*** 
Foundation Trust * Distance^2   -0.0005*** 0.0001** 0.0019*** 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 0.0019*** 0.0017*** 
Patients Group  LSOAs 175946 184324 187504 197304 201694 213538 237493 243430 267771 
LSOAs 29974 29436 29614 29740 29884 30669 30915 31108 31552 
Chi^2 model 2187257 2202837 2065478 2196952 2380851 2759517 3177565 3240990 3558575 
Efron R^2 0.249 0.2485 0.2493 0.2629 0.2592 0.2661 0.2411 0.2447 0.2426 
Notes. Specification (20). All booked or waiting list patients treated in hospitals with at least 100 admissions per year and within 30km from LSOA of residence.  Efron R
2 
is the squared 
correlation between actual and predicted numbers choosing each site.   *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
